Press releases

Treasury Opens the New Designation Cycle for Opportunity Zones

U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Public Affairs Press Release: July 1, 2026 Contact: Treasury Public Affairs, Press@treasury.gov Treasury Opens the New Designation Cycle for Opportunity Zones The Working Families Tax Cuts Permanently Established a Process for States to Drive More Capital to Overlooked Communities Across America WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of the Treasury announced the opening of the next nomination period for states, territories, and the District of Columbia to nominate eligible communities to be designated as Qualified Opportunity Zones (QOZs). Under President Trump’s Working Families Tax Cuts, the Opportunity Zone tax incentive was permanently renewed, enhanced incentives for investment in eligible rural communities were added, and a process was established for redesignating zones every 10 years. “Under President Trump’s leadership, the Working Families Tax Cuts permanently renewed and strengthened Opportunity Zones, giving investors, entrepreneurs, and local leaders the long-term certainty they need to commit capital to communities that have been overlooked for too long,” said Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent . “With the nomination period now open, governors have the opportunity to help direct private investment to communities that stand to benefit most. Treasury looks forward to working with states to expand economic opportunity, support job creation, and unlock long-term growth in communities across the country.” To assist with this process, the Community Development Financial Institutions Fund (CDFI Fund) has developed an Opportunity Zone Nomination Tool , through which governors can identify and select communities, and access detailed instructions for completing and submitting nominations. Background Under President Trump’s Working Families Tax Cuts, the permanent renewal of the Opportunity Zone tax incentives, including enhanced incentives for investment in eligible rural communities, will continue to boost private investment to underserved communities across America, building on tens of billions of private sector dollars already invested since these tax incentives were established by the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. The current nomination period will determine which census tracts are eligible for new investment beginning January 1, 2027. Because new designations will occur only once every 10 years, jurisdictions that do not nominate an eligible tract during this window would not have another opportunity until the next designation cycle. The census tracts eligible for designation include some of the most distressed areas in the country, and designation as a QOZ can help attract new investment, create jobs, stimulate economic growth, and provide meaningful opportunities for residents. The poverty rate, median family income rate and other variables will be available in the CDFI Fund’s Community Investment Mapping System (CIMS) and on the Treasury Department’s data transparency page which is available here . On April 6, the Treasury Department and the IRS also released a list of 25,332 eligible census tracts for nomination, of which 8,334 are eligible for rural benefits enacted as part of the Working Families Tax Cuts. Additional information on nomination procedures was sent directly to the Governors and the Mayor of the District of Columbia. The list of eligible census tracts is available here . ###

SEC Publishes Updated Market Statistics, Highlighting Increase in IPOs and Proceeds Raised

The Securities and Exchange Commission’s Division of Economic and Risk Analysis (DERA) published updated statistics and data visualizations covering key segments of the U.S. capital markets, including three new asset-backed securities (ABS) issuance data…

Treasury Targets Criminal Facilitators Behind CJNG’s Cross‑Border Fuel Smuggling Schemes

U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Public Affairs Press Release: June 30, 2026 Contact: Treasury Public Affairs, Press@treasury.gov Treasury Targets Criminal Facilitators Behind CJNG’s Cross‑Border Fuel Smuggling Schemes Treasury Issues Alert on Cartel Fuel Smuggling and Tax Evasion Schemes on the U.S. Southern Border WASHINGTON —Today, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) announced multiple actions combatting fuel smuggling schemes linked to Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion (CJNG), a violent drug cartel designated under both counternarcotics and counterterrorism authorities. OFAC has sanctioned two Mexican nationals and nine entities tied to a CJNG-linked fuel theft scheme—involving cross-border smuggling, falsified customs documents, and shell companies—to evade Mexican taxes while generating tens of millions of dollars annually for the cartel. In addition, FinCEN issued a supplemental Alert providing additional guidance on financial typologies and red flags indicative of CJNG and other Mexico-based transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) smuggling fuel from the United States into Mexico in schemes involving Mexican tax evasion. "Today's action highlights the extent to which Mexico's cartels are expanding beyond traditional drug trafficking to generate revenue for their criminal organizations, which continue to traffic deadly drugs that kill Americans," said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent . "Treasury's actions targeting these illicit revenue streams advance the Trump Administration's priority of dismantling these terrorist organizations and making America safe again." Today’s action reflects strong collaboration between OFAC and FinCEN, and was coordinated with a South Texas Homeland Security Task Force (HSTF)-led investigation involving the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Internal Revenue Service – Criminal Investigation (IRS-CI), Department of Commerce – Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), among others. OFAC and FinCEN work in close coordination with the HSTFs, which target the proliferation of illicit drugs and the networks, enablers, and financial mechanisms that support their production and distribution. Today’s sanctions were also developed jointly with the Government of Mexico’s financial intelligence unit, the Unidad de Inteligencia Financiera (UIF). Among those designated is Oscar Guillermo Juraidini Silva , who supports CJNG in a fuel smuggling enterprise that generates hundreds of millions of dollars each year. FinCEN’s Alert is one of several recent FinCEN advisory and analytic products on revenue streams and illicit activity associated with Mexico-based FTOs and other criminal organizations, to include the procurement of fentanyl precursor chemicals and fentanyl-related threat patterns and trends ; timeshare fraud ; human smuggling along the southwest border ; bulk cash smuggling ; Chinese money laundering networks and associated threat patterns and trends ; crude oil smuggling on the southwest border ; cross-border funds transfers involving illegal aliens ; human trafficking associated with the 2026 FIFA World Cup ; and non-work authorized populations and their employers and risks to the integrity of the U.S. financial system . CJNG: VIOLENT DRUG CARTEL AND FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION CJNG is a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization (FTO) and specially designated global terrorist (SDGT) that is responsible for a significant proportion of fentanyl and other deadly drugs trafficked into the United States. On February 20, 2025 , the Department of State designated CJNG as an FTO and SDGT. Treasury previously sanctioned CJNG on April 8, 2015 pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act and on December 15, 2021 pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14059, which targets the international proliferation of illicit drugs and their means of production. OFAC has taken numerous actions against CJNG-linked individuals and companies for enabling drug trafficking, money laundering, and corruption. In recent years, Mexico-based drug trafficking cartels like CJNG have become increasingly involved in the theft, adulteration, and smuggling of hydrocarbons, such as fuel and oil, in schemes colloquially referred to in Mexico as huachicol. These schemes have grown into powerful revenue generators for CJNG through the theft of tens of billions of dollars in lost revenue for the Mexican government and have enabled CJNG campaigns of narcotics trafficking in the United States, violence against Mexican government forces along the U.S. southwest border, and corruption within Mexico. Over the last two years, OFAC has taken a series of actions targeting cartel involvement in the illicit practice of huachicol , including on September 10, 2024 and on May 1, 2025 . Similarly, FinCEN’s May 2025 Alert provided financial typologies and red flags indicative of crude oil smuggling schemes on the U.S. southwest border associated with CJNG and other Mexico-based TCOs. In the 12-month period following this Alert, FinCEN received over 160 Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) that detailed over $7 billion in suspicious activity, sent primarily between the United States and Mexico and often involving Mexican cartels, most commonly CJNG. The most common U.S. states involved in the SARs are Texas and Florida. In Texas, the subjects were mostly located in cities and towns near the U.S.–Mexico border, including Brownsville, Mission, Eagle Pass, and McAllen with most subjects involved in the oil and natural gas and transportation industries. CRUDE CRIMINALS AND BEYOND: MEXICAN NORTHBOUND OIL SMUGGLING AND SOUTHBOUND FUEL SMUGGLING Huachicol -related activities are currently the most significant non-drug revenue source for Mexican cartels and other illicit actors. Huachicol -related activities generally encompass (1) fuel and oil theft in Mexico, (2) the smuggling of crude oil into the United States, and (3) the smuggling of fuel from the United States into Mexico involving Mexican tax evasion schemes known as fiscal fuel theft ( huachicol fiscal ). Thieves in Mexico (known as huachicoleros ) use a variety of means to steal fuel and crude oil from Mexico’s state-owned energy company, Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex), including bribing corrupt Pemex employees, illegally drilling taps into pipelines, stealing from refineries, hijacking tanker trucks, and threatening Pemex employees. Fuel stolen from Pemex is sold on the black market around Mexico. As highlighted in FinCEN’s May 2025 Alert, stolen crude oil is smuggled into the United States through complicit Mexican brokers and often mislabeled as “waste oil” or other hazardous material to avoid scrutiny and evade taxes and regulations. The oil is then delivered to complicit U.S. importers in the oil and natural gas industry operating near the U.S. southwest border, who sell it at a steep discount on the U.S. and global energy markets before repatriating the significant illicit profits back to the cartels in Mexico. As FinCEN’s supplemental Alert highlights, fiscal fuel theft schemes involve Mexico-based cartels and their huachicoleros smuggling gasoline, diesel, naphtha, and other fuel from the United States across the southern border or U.S. ports into Mexico in schemes to evade Mexico’s import tax on fuel, known as I mpuesto Especial sobre Producción y Servicios (IEPS). Through these schemes, the cartels use complicit Mexican trading companies ( comercializadoras ) with fuel distribution permits from Mexico’s National Energy Commission (Comisión Nacional de Energía) to purchase fuel from complicit U.S. fuel distribution companies and issue false invoices to legitimize and commercialize the illicit fuel in Mexico. These brokers, however, lack the appropriate permits from Mexico’s Secretariat of Energy (Secretaría de Energía) to import fuel into Mexico. As part of the scheme, complicit U.S. fuel distributors leverage their relationships with major U.S. refineries and fuel distributors to purchase and then divert fuel to interconnected networks of U.S. and Mexican front and shell companies in the freight, logistics, and other industries before it is smuggled into Mexico via tanker trucks, railcars, and shadow fleets of maritime vessels. The Mexican cartels and their huachicoleros can evade the IEPS through various means, including misclassifying customs documentation, bribery of government officials, or other methods before transporting the fuel to storage yards under their control and then selling it within Mexico for a steep profit through cartel-controlled or affiliated gas stations and unregulated roadside fuel stops. Public reporting suggests that a quarter to a third of all fuel sold in Mexico may be illicit. According to FinCEN’s analysis of Bank Secrecy Act reporting, the Mexican cartels primarily use the brokers and their access to the Mexican financial system to send international wire transfers and digital asset payments to the complicit U.S. fuel distribution companies for the smuggled fuel — either directly or through shell companies acting as pass-through accounts. In other cases, the cartels may pay the complicit U.S. fuel distributors directly through structured cash deposits into their bank accounts with illicit proceeds from drug trafficking and other criminal activities in the United States as a form of trade-based money laundering. The complicit U.S. fuel distributors obfuscate these ill-gotten fuel sales through a variety of money laundering typologies including purchases of (i) luxury goods such as high-end vehicles, high-value jewelry or exclusive vacation rentals/travel destinations; (ii) real estate; and (iii) investment assets. In Mexico, the cartels use their illicit profits from the black market fuel sales to make cash payments to Mexican political campaigns and media outlets to help elect corrupt Mexican politicians willing to assist the cartels control key administrative positions in the government, which facilitates fuel smuggling operations and access to state contracts to launder the illicit profits from these schemes and other criminal activities. FRACTURING CJNG’S FUEL FACILITATORS Building upon OFAC’s prior actions, today OFAC designated Oscar Guillermo Juraidini Silva ( Juraidini ), who is a key business person facilitating CJNG’s fuel theft enterprise. Juraidini operates as an accountant and the mastermind behind certain financial operations for CJNG. Juraidini creates and operates shell companies on behalf of CJNG, and falsifies customs documents for CJNG to aid in the illicit cross-border transfer of fuel. Juraidini imports fuel from the United States into Mexico that is intentionally mislabeled in customs documentation to circumvent Mexican IEPS taxes. The majority of Juraidini’s clients are gas station companies, which receive the refined fuel products and sell them via retail gas stations. Juraidini generates tens of millions of dollars annually, benefiting CJNG. Juraidini owns six businesses in Mexico, operating in transportation, financial services, and real estate sectors. Juraidini’s Mexican companies include: Centro Cambiario La Peseta, S.A. de C.V. ; OJ Living Trust, S.A.P.I. de C.V. ; RK Real King, S.A. de C.V. ; Soma Transporte y Servicios, S.A. de C.V. ; Ogui Fletes ; and OF Transportes . In addition, Juraidini owns a business based in the United Kingdom, Cucumber Sweet Waves Ltd . OFAC designated Oscar Guillermo Juraidini Silva pursuant to E.O. 14059 and E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, CJNG. Additionally, OFAC designated the companies Centro Cambiario La Peseta, S.A. de C.V.; OJ Living Trust, S.A.P.I. de C.V.; RK Real King, S.A. de C.V.; Soma Transporte y Servicios, S.A. de C.V.; Ogui Fletes; OF Transportes; and Cucumber Sweet Waves Ltd pursuant to E.O. 14059 and E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Oscar Guillermo Juraidini Silva. Today, OFAC also designated J. Refugio Ruiz Villagomez , who plays a role in Jomadi Logistics & Cargo, S.A. de C.V. ( Jomadi ) and Ahavat Logistics Solution, S.A. de C.V. ( Ahavat ). J. Refugio Ruiz Villagomez has knowingly smuggled fuel from the United States into Mexico without proper permits. He pays fees to cartels and other criminal organizations that control ports of entry between the United States and Mexico. According to investigative findings made public by Mexico’s Attorney General’s office, Jomadi is an import and export company involved in huachicol fiscal . Jomadi and Ahavat have transacted through the U.S. financial system to the tune of tens of millions of dollars with third parties linked to CJNG that have been involved in huachicol -related activities. OFAC designated Jomadi Logistics & Cargo, S.A. de C.V. and Ahavat Logistics Solution, S.A. de C.V. pursuant to E.O. 14059 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services in support of, CJNG. Additionally, OFAC designated Jomadi Logistics & Cargo, S.A. de C.V. and Ahavat Logistics Solution, S.A. de C.V. pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, CJNG. OFAC also designated J. Refugio Ruiz Villagomez pursuant to E.O. 14059 and E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Jomadi Logistics & Cargo, S.A. de C.V. and Ahavat Logistics Solution, S.A. de C.V. SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated or blocked persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked persons. Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities involving designated or otherwise blocked persons. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated or blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person. Non-U.S. persons are also prohibited from causing or conspiring to cause U.S. persons to wittingly or unwittingly violate U.S. sanctions, as well as engaging in conduct that evades U.S. sanctions. Individuals located in the United States or abroad who provide information about sanctions violations to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s whistleblower incentive program may be eligible for awards if the information they provide leads to a successful enforcement action that results in monetary penalties exceeding $1,000,000. Furthermore, engaging in certain transactions involving the persons designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, may risk the imposition of secondary sanctions on participating foreign financial institutions. OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on opening or maintaining, in the United States, a correspondent account or a payable-through account of a foreign financial institution that knowingly conducts or facilitates any significant transaction on behalf of a person who is designated pursuant to the relevant authority. The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC’s guidance on Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List . Click here to view a chart on the persons designated today . Click here for more information on the persons designated today . ###

SEC Seeks Public Comment on Novel Exchange-Traded Funds

The Securities and Exchange Commission today issued a request for public comment on exchange-traded funds (ETFs) seeking to invest in innovative asset classes or engage in novel investment strategies. The request focuses on ways to facilitate innovation…

Department of War Launches New Website to Help Industry Partners Navigate Section 805 Supply Chain Requirements

The War Department launched a website to provide guidance and resources for industry partners on the implementation of Section 805 of the fiscal 2024 National Defense Authorization Act, which restricts future DOW procurement from entities on the Section 1260H list of Chinese military companies.

Treasury Sanctions Networks Fueling Sudan’s Civil War and Worsening Humanitarian Crisis

U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Public Affairs Press Release: June 26, 2026 Contact: Treasury Public Affairs, Press@treasury.gov Treasury Sanctions Networks Fueling Sudan’s Civil War and Worsening Humanitarian Crisis WASHINGTON — Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed sanctions on eight individuals and entities linked to procurement and recruitment networks that continue to fuel Sudan’s devastating civil war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary group, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). These networks have enabled both sides to expand the scale and intensity of the conflict, contributing to one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises and further destabilizing an already fragile region. The ongoing violence has also created conditions that allow for terrorist groups to grow, posing threats to the security and interests of the United States. “The Trump Administration is committed to advancing a lasting peace in Sudan and bringing an end to the conflict,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent . “The networks profiting from the conflict in Sudan jeopardize the prospects for the humanitarian truce that the Sudanese people desperately need.” The United States calls on the SAF and the RSF to accept and implement an immediate, unconditional three-month humanitarian truce. Such a truce would allow additional humanitarian assistance to reach those in need, safeguard civilian populations, and create space for further negotiations toward a permanent ceasefire. The United States again calls on external actors to cease all financial and military support to the parties involved in the conflict. Today’s action was taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14098, “Imposing Sanctions on Certain Persons Destabilizing Sudan and Undermining the Goal of a Democratic Transition.” OFAC’s investigation of the individuals and entities designated today was conducted in close partnership with the United States Customs and Border Protection, National Targeting Center. SAF PROCUREMENT COMPANIES AND SUPPLIER The Defense Industries System (DIS), Sudan’s largest defense enterprise, supports and maintains the SAF’s arsenal of arms, ammunition, vehicles, and material, often acquired from Iran and other external backers. DIS controls numerous subsidiaries, including the Sudanese conglomerate, Giad Industrial Group (Giad)—also known as Sudan Master Technology—through complex and opaque structures from which DIS has generated billions of dollars. OFAC designated DIS and Giad on June 1, 2023 . DIS’s acquisition of military equipment and related material has enabled the SAF to sustain combat operations against the RSF, conduct attacks against civilians, and reject and obstruct efforts to cease hostilities and achieve a ceasefire. Target Multiactivities Company Ltd. (TMAC) is a Sudan-based company controlled by DIS through Giad. With senior DIS officer Tariq Hussain Muhammad Madani ( Madani ) serving as managing director, TMAC has imported explosives and related material into Sudan from Egyptian and Indian companies, including India-based explosives manufacturer, SBL Energy Limited (SBL). These explosives are subsequently used in bombs deployed by the SAF. SBL, whose chief executive officer is Indian national Alok Choudhari ( Choudhari ), has supplied TMAC with over 200 shipments of explosives and explosives-related materiel since 2024. Ports Engineering Company LTD (Ports Engineering) is a Sudan-based public construction company owned by Sudanese state-owned enterprises, including Giad. Since the start of the conflict in April 2023, Ports Engineering has imported uniforms and footwear worn by Sudanese intelligence personnel from an Emirati company, and ammunition belts and boxes of weapons from a Turkish company. OFAC designated TMAC pursuant to E.O. 14098 for being a foreign person who is owned or controlled by, or has acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, DIS, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14098. OFAC designated Madani pursuant to E.O. 14098 for being a foreign person who is or has been a leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors of TMAC, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14098 relating to the tenure of such leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors. OFAC designated SBL pursuant to E.O. 14098 for being a foreign person who has materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, TMAC, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14098. OFAC designated Choudhari pursuant to E.O. 14098 for being a foreign person who is or has been a leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors of SBL, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14098 relating to the tenure of such leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors. OFAC designated Ports Engineering pursuant to E.O. 14098 for being a foreign person who is owned or controlled by, or has acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Sudan Master Technology, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14098. COLOMBIAN RECRUITING NETWORK ASSOCIATES OFAC took action in December 2025 and April 2026 against a transnational network led by retired Colombian military officer Alvaro Andres Quijano Becerra (Quijano) and his wife, Claudia Viviana Oliveros Forero (Oliveros), who have been recruiting former Colombian military personnel to fight in Sudan for the RSF, an armed group that has committed genocide. Quijano and Oliveros have carried out this scheme using companies under their control, including Colombia-based companies International Services Agency (A4SI) and Fénix Human Resources S.A.S., and Panama-based company, Talent Bridge, S.A. (formerly known as Global Staffing S.A.), which was used to minimize A4SI’s legal exposure and obfuscate the links between A4SI and the company hiring the Colombian fighters. Panamanian nationals Enrique Daniel Palacios Quintanilla (Palacios) and Jack Peter Derman Guzman (Derman), and Colombian national Fredy Alejandro Lopez Ocampo (Lopez) were associated with Talent Bridge S.A. dating back to the company’s creation in 2022, each holding official roles. Palacios served as a resident agent, director, and secretary. Derman served as a director, subscriber, empowered representative, and treasurer, and he succeeded Oliveros as president in July 2025, which is when the company rebranded as Talent Bridge, S.A. Lopez served as a secretary, director, and subscriber. OFAC designated Palacios, Derman, and Lopez pursuant to E.O. 14098 for being foreign persons who are or have been leaders, officials, senior executive officers, or members of the board of directors of Talent Bridge, S.A., an entity whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14098 relating to the tenure of such leaders, officials, senior executive officers, or members of the board of directors SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated or blocked persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked persons. Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities involving designated or otherwise blocked persons. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated or blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person. Non-U.S. persons are also prohibited from causing or conspiring to cause U.S. persons to wittingly or unwittingly violate U.S. sanctions, as well as engaging in conduct that evades U.S. sanctions. Individuals located in the U.S. or abroad who provide information about sanctions violations to Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network whistleblower incentive program may be eligible for awards if the information they provide leads to a successful enforcement action that results in monetary penalties exceeding $1,000,000. The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC’s guidance on Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List . Click here for more information on the persons designated today . ###

CFTC, SEC Seek Public Comment on the Harmonization of Portfolio Margining Frameworks

SEC, CFTC Seek Public Comment on the Harmonization of Portfolio Margining Frameworks

The Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission today issued a joint request for public comment on potential approaches to further harmonize regulatory frameworks applicable to portfolio margining across securities,…

FSIS Issues Public Health Alert for Boneless Chicken Breast Product Due to Misbranding and Undeclared Allergens

FSIS Issues Public Health Alert for Boneless Chicken Breast Product Due to Misbranding and Undeclared Allergens The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) is issuing a public health alert for raw boneless chicken breast products due to misbranding and undeclared allergens. The product contains eggs, a known allergen, which is not declared on the product label. A recall was not requested because the product is no longer available for purchase.

FSIS Issues Public Health Alert for Ready-To-Eat Chicken Caesar Wrap Products That May Be Contaminated With Listeria

FSIS Issues Public Health Alert for Ready-To-Eat Chicken Caesar Wrap Products That May Be Contaminated With Listeria The U.S. Department of Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) is issuing a public health alert for ready-to-eat chicken Caesar wrap products due to concerns that the product may be contaminated with Listeria monocytogenes ( Lm ). A recall was not requested because the products are no longer available for purchase.

NRC Proposes Major Update to Radioactive Waste Disposal Rules

Treasury Sanctions Rwandan Gold Refinery and Network Enabling Illicit Conflict Minerals Trade

U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Public Affairs Press Release: June 25, 2026 Contact: Treasury Public Affairs, Press@treasury.gov Treasury Sanctions Rwandan Gold Refinery and Network Enabling Illicit Conflict Minerals Trade WASHINGTON —Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed sanctions on a network working in coordination with the Rwandan-backed March 23 Movement (M23) to illegally smuggle minerals from eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to Rwanda. This action supports the historic U.S.-brokered Washington Accords for Peace and Prosperity , signed on December 4, 2025, by the leaders of the DRC and Rwanda. It reinforces their commitment to implement a Regional Economic Integration Framework designed to expand trade and investment, strengthen transparency across critical minerals supply chains, and lay the foundation for greater long-term economic opportunity throughout the region. “The United States will not allow rogue groups to profit from the illicit mineral trade and destabilize the region,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent . “The Democratic Republic of the Congo’s mineral wealth rightfully belongs to the Congolese people. Under President Trump’s leadership, we will continue to take decisive action against those who enable violence, exploitation, and attacks against the Congolese people.” M23—designated by both the United States and the United Nations as an armed group—has committed numerous human rights abuses and continues to undermine regional peace efforts. M23’s control and trafficking of illicit minerals directly fuel its destabilizing operations and further exacerbates the humanitarian crisis in the DRC. CONFLICT MINERALS: FUNDING VIOLENCE AND UNDERMINING GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS The United States is a key partner to the DRC and Rwanda in implementing the vision of the Washington Accords brokered by President Trump to achieve lasting peace and establish a fully licit and transparent regional minerals sector. Disrupting conflict mineral networks and encouraging all supply chain actors to exercise greater due diligence is necessary to create the space for the DRC, Rwanda, and other partners to build a new system that will reinforce peace, drive economic growth for the people of the region, and contribute to secure global supply chains. On August 12, 2025 , Treasury took action against a network of entities linked to illegal mining in the DRC. As Treasury highlighted in that designation, the trafficking of conflict minerals is linked to violence and abuses against civilians and impedes responsible and legal investment in the region that would benefit local communities. Treasury has taken several actions targeting actors driving the conflict in eastern DRC since Rwanda and the DRC signed the Washington Accords, including on March 2, 2026 , April 30, 2026 , and most recently on June 2, 2026 . As Treasury highlighted in these previous designations, M23 has captured large portions of territory in eastern DRC, including the capitals of North and South Kivu provinces, Goma and Bukavu, with direct military, financial, and logistical support from the military of Rwanda, known as the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF). OFAC sanctioned the RDF on March 2, 2026 for actively supporting, training, and fighting alongside M23, including supporting M23 as it seized these critical regions in eastern DRC. These regions are home to strategic mining sites that are rich in mineral wealth rightfully belonging to the Congolese people, and M23 has exploited this wealth to purchase weapons and equipment, pay fighters, and commit abuses targeting Congolese civilians. On July 8, 2024, the U.S. Department of State highlighted concerns with the illicit trade and exploitation of certain minerals that contribute to ongoing instability in eastern DRC. The United States remains concerned about the conflict and humanitarian crisis in eastern DRC, as well as the role that the illicit trade of minerals continues to play in financing the conflict. In many cases, minerals sourced from eastern DRC are smuggled through Rwanda before being transported to major refining and processing countries, such as China. Minerals sourced from conflict-affected areas directly or indirectly benefit armed groups, who raise funds by selling minerals and imposing illegal “taxation” schemes, often in collusion with corrupt local officials. In addition, the mines controlled by armed groups like M23 are linked to a wide range of human rights abuse, such as forced labor, child labor, and sexual and gender-based violence, as well as dangerous working conditions, as evidenced by the March 2026 collapse of a mine shaft at the M23-controlled Rubaya coltan mine in eastern DRC that killed over 200 people, including children. MINERALS LAUNDERING SCHEME Since M23’s take over of the provincial capitals, Gasabo Gold Refinery LTD ( Gasabo Gold ) has acted as a key partner to Rwandan government officials and M23 rebels as they sourced and transported gold out of eastern DRC. Following the removal of gold from mines in RDF/M23-occupied areas in South Kivu, Rwandan government forces have had strict oversight of the gold until it reached Gasabo Gold. RDF soldiers and M23 rebels have ensured the safe transport of gold from M23-held areas to Rusizi District, Rwanda, immediately over the border from Bukavu, DRC to Gasabo Gold in Kigali, Rwanda, via ground or air transport. Upon reaching Gasabo Gold, RDF and M23 personnel have handed the gold over to Gasabo Gold personnel, who immediately began the gold refinement process. In early 2026 at least 60 kg of gold, representing millions of dollars in value, were moved from eastern DRC to Gasabo Gold through this scheme. The European Union previously designated Gasabo Gold for its role in transporting illegally extracted gold from the DRC. Jean Malic Kalima ( Kalima ) is the Chairman of Gasabo Gold, while Bosco Kayobotsi runs its day-to-day operations as General Manager. Kalima also controls the Rwandan mining companies Bugambira Mines LTD ( Bugambira Mines ), Wolfram Mining and Processing LTD ( Wolfram Mining ), and Rwinkwavu Mining Corporation LTD ( Rwinkwavu Mining ). Gasabo Gold is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13413, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, logistical, or technological support for, or goods or services in support of, M23. In addition, Gasabo Gold is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13413, as amended, for being responsible for or complicit in, or having engaged in, directly or indirectly, support to persons, including armed groups, involved in activities that threaten the peace, security, or stability of the Democratic Republic of the Congo or that undermine democratic processes or institutions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, through the illicit trade in natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Kalima and Kayobotsi are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13413, as amended, for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Gasabo Gold. Bugambira Mines, Wolfram Mining, and Rwinkwavu Mining are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13413, as amended, for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Kalima. SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated or blocked person described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked persons. Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities involving designated or otherwise blocked persons. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated or blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person. Non-U.S. persons are also prohibited from causing or conspiring to cause U.S. persons to wittingly or unwittingly violate U.S. sanctions, as well as engaging in conduct that evades U.S. sanctions. Individuals located in the U.S. or abroad who provide information about sanctions violations to Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network whistleblower incentive program may be eligible for awards if the information they provide leads to a successful enforcement action that results in monetary penalties exceeding $1,000,000. The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC’s guidance on Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List . Click here for more information on the person designated today . ###