Department of the Treasury press releases

Treasury and IRS to Accept Philanthropic Stock Contributions for Trump Accounts

U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Public Affairs Press Release: July 2, 2026 Contact: Treasury Public Affairs, Press@treasury.gov Treasury and IRS to Accept Philanthropic Stock Contributions for Trump Accounts WASHINGTON, D.C. — The U.S. Department of the Treasury today announced that it will accept large philanthropic contributions of readily tradable public company stock to support Trump Accounts. This announcement comes ahead of the formal launch of Trump Accounts on July 4, 2026. Under the new process, eligible philanthropic contributors may transfer approved publicly traded stock to Treasury. The stock will be contributed to Trump Accounts for eligible children consistent with the donor’s instructions, applicable law, and Treasury guidance. “Today’s announcement makes it easier for philanthropists to help American children build long-term financial security,” said Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent . “By accepting contributions of publicly traded stock, Treasury is creating a practical pathway for large-scale private giving to support the next generation.” Trump Accounts are designed to help eligible children begin saving and investing early in life. Over six million families have signed up for Trump Accounts prior to the official launch of the program this month. Parents can download the official app to get started today. For more information about Trump Accounts, visit trumpaccounts.gov. ###

Treasury Announces Investment Lineup for Trump Accounts

U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Public Affairs Press Release: July 1, 2026 Contact: Treasury Public Affairs, Press@treasury.gov Treasury Announces Investment Lineup for Trump Accounts WASHINGTON, D.C. — The U.S. Department of the Treasury today announced the investment lineup for Trump Accounts, including the initial default investment that will be available at launch and four additional low-cost index fund options that responsible parties will be able to elect in the coming months. Through Trump Accounts, American families will be able to choose among the lowest cost options available to invest in their children’s future. At launch, all contributions to Trump Accounts will be invested in the State Street SPDR Portfolio S&P 500 ETF (SPYM) a low-cost exchange-traded fund (ETF) that tracks the performance of the S&P 500 Index. The fund was selected to provide broad exposure to the U.S. stock market while maintaining expenses well below the statutory fee limitation. Treasury has also selected the following additional low-cost index ETFs for the Trump Accounts investment lineup: iShares Core S&P 500 ETF (IVV) Vanguard Total Stock Market ETF (VTI) State Street SPDR Portfolio S&P 1500 Composite Stock Market ETF (SPTM) iShares Core S&P total U.S. Stock Market ETF (ITOT) These funds have been selected to provide diversified exposure across major segments of the financial markets while keeping investment costs low. At launch, the SPYM will serve as the default investment for all Trump Accounts. In the coming months, Treasury expects to make available functionality that will allow parents or guardians to choose how to allocate funds across the additional investment options. Until that functionality is available, all contributions will remain invested in the default fund. Treasury will announce when investment election functionality becomes available and will provide instructions for responsible parties wishing to change their account's investment allocation. For more information about Trump Accounts, visit trumpaccounts.gov ###

Treasury Sanctions Brazilian Criminal Network Exploiting U.S. Financial System to Launder Drug Proceeds

U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Public Affairs Press Release: July 1, 2026 Contact: Treasury Public Affairs, Press@treasury.gov Treasury Sanctions Brazilian Criminal Network Exploiting U.S. Financial System to Launder Drug Proceeds WASHINGTON— Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated two Brazilian nationals, three Brazilian companies, and one Portuguese company for their links to Latin America’s largest criminal gang, Brazil-based Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC). PCC represents a significant threat to U.S. national security, as its operatives throughout the United States, particularly in Florida, launder drug proceeds and contribute to a cycle of criminality. PCC is now the largest transnational criminal organization (TCO) in the Western Hemisphere, and in recent years has expanded its operations globally, with significant presence in countries such as the United Kingdom, Turkey, and Japan. In the United States, PCC represents a real and growing criminal threat. Networks such as the one targeted today engage in drug trafficking, bulk cash smuggling for cartels, and other illicit activities to generate revenue streams for PCC. Recent law enforcement actions by Brazilian authorities revealed a PCC-controlled trade-based money laundering operation utilizing a Chinese electronics distribution network and Chinese e-commerce platform to launder more than $190 million over seven months. “This designation is another step by the United States government to address and acknowledge the increasing presence of Primeiro Comando da Capital’s illicit revenue generation within our borders,” said Gene Lange , who is performing the duties of the Under Secretary for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence . “Organized crime within the Western Hemisphere must not be allowed to establish operations on American soil that contribute to criminality and lawlessness.” Today’s action reflects the culmination of a coordinated Homeland Security Task Force (HSTF)-led investigation involving the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s (FBI) Miami Field Office and the U.S. Department of Justice’s (DOJ) Money Laundering, Narcotics and Forfeiture Section. OFAC works in close coordination with the HSTFs, which target the proliferation of illicit drugs and the networks, enablers, and financial mechanisms that support their production and distribution. This unified, whole-of-government approach ensures operational coordination to maximize the impact against transnational criminal networks. This action was taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14059, which targets the proliferation of illicit drugs and their means of production, as well as E.O. 13224, as amended, which targets terrorists and their supporters. DOJ AND TREASURY COORDINATE TO DISRUPT A PCC MONEY LAUNDERING NETWORK The PCC money laundering network targeted in today’s action has operated from two main locations: Florida and São Paulo, Brazil. In January 2026, FBI arrested six members of the Florida-based group who have been indicted on money laundering charges in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Today’s OFAC action targets the São Paulo-based node of the network, led by Victor Henrique de Oliveira Shimada (Shimada) and Stella Stefanie Nunes Henrique de Oliveira (Stella). São Paulo-based Shimada has been a key link between the Florida-based PCC operatives and foreign drug traffickers. Shimada and his organization have laundered more than $30 million in illicit proceeds generated in and around multiple cities in the United States, utilizing cryptocurrency to move funds back to Brazil on behalf of PCC. Shimada has also engaged in other financial crimes beyond the laundering of drug proceeds. In January 2025, Shimada was briefly held under house arrest in Brazil because one of his companies, Victory Trading Intermediacão De Negocios Cobrancas E Tecnologia Ltda (Victory Trading), was used to launder money stolen from a Brazilian soccer club as part of an advertising fraud scheme. Stella is a close associate and relative of Shimada who has worked as his secretary and served as a broker for bulk cash pickups, providing critical logistical services that have supported Shimada and his network in their laundering operations. Victor Henrique de Oliveira Shimada is being designated today pursuant to Executive Order 14059 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services in support of PCC. Additionally, Shimada is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, PCC. Stella Stefanie Nunes Henrique de Oliveira is being designated today pursuant to Executive Order 14059 and E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Victor Henrique de Oliveira Shimada. PREVIOUS OFAC ACTIONS TARGETING PCC Today marks OFAC’s third action against the PCC and its operatives. On March 14, 2024 , OFAC designated Diego Macedo Gonçalves do Carmo pursuant to E.O. 14059 for the significant role he played in laundering significant sums of money for PCC. On December 15, 2021 , OFAC designated PCC as an organization pursuant to E.O. 14059 for having engaged in, or attempted to engage in, activities or transactions that have materially contributed to, or pose a significant risk of materially contributing to, the international proliferation of illicit drugs or their means of production. AN EXTENSIVE CORPORATE NETWORK CONTROLLED BY PCC Relying on a network of companies, Shimada is able to evade detection while receiving illicit funds generated in the United States and launder these funds for PCC in Brazil. The companies include Victory Trading, Pixwave Solucoes De Pagamentos Ltda (Pixwave), and Wave Construcoes Inteligentes Ltda (Wave), all based in São Paulo. Victory Trading and Wave are financial services companies; Pixwave is a construction company. Additionally, Shimada owns Avenidas Flutuantes Unipessoal Lda , a transportation and storage company based near Lisbon, Portugal. Victory Trading Intermediacão De Negocios Cobrancas E Tecnologia Ltda, Pixwave Solucoes De Pagamentos Ltda, Wave Construcoes Inteligentes Ltda, and Avenidas Flutuantes Unipessoal Lda are being designated today pursuant to E.O. 14059 and E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Shimada. SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated or blocked persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked persons. Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities involving designated or otherwise blocked persons. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated or blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person. Non-U.S. persons are also prohibited from causing or conspiring to cause U.S. persons to wittingly or unwittingly violate U.S. sanctions, as well as engaging in conduct that evades U.S. sanctions. Individuals located in the U.S. or abroad who provide information about sanctions violations to the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s (FinCEN) whistleblower incentive program may be eligible for awards if the information they provide leads to a successful enforcement action that results in monetary penalties exceeding $1,000,000. Furthermore, engaging in certain transactions involving the persons designated today may risk the imposition of secondary sanctions on participating foreign financial institutions. OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on opening or maintaining, in the United States, a correspondent account or a payable-through account of a foreign financial institution that knowingly conducts or facilitates any significant transaction on behalf of a person who is designated pursuant to the relevant authority. The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC’s guidance on Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List . For more information on the persons designated today, click here . ###

Treasury Opens the New Designation Cycle for Opportunity Zones

U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Public Affairs Press Release: July 1, 2026 Contact: Treasury Public Affairs, Press@treasury.gov Treasury Opens the New Designation Cycle for Opportunity Zones The Working Families Tax Cuts Permanently Established a Process for States to Drive More Capital to Overlooked Communities Across America WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of the Treasury announced the opening of the next nomination period for states, territories, and the District of Columbia to nominate eligible communities to be designated as Qualified Opportunity Zones (QOZs). Under President Trump’s Working Families Tax Cuts, the Opportunity Zone tax incentive was permanently renewed, enhanced incentives for investment in eligible rural communities were added, and a process was established for redesignating zones every 10 years. “Under President Trump’s leadership, the Working Families Tax Cuts permanently renewed and strengthened Opportunity Zones, giving investors, entrepreneurs, and local leaders the long-term certainty they need to commit capital to communities that have been overlooked for too long,” said Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent . “With the nomination period now open, governors have the opportunity to help direct private investment to communities that stand to benefit most. Treasury looks forward to working with states to expand economic opportunity, support job creation, and unlock long-term growth in communities across the country.” To assist with this process, the Community Development Financial Institutions Fund (CDFI Fund) has developed an Opportunity Zone Nomination Tool , through which governors can identify and select communities, and access detailed instructions for completing and submitting nominations. Background Under President Trump’s Working Families Tax Cuts, the permanent renewal of the Opportunity Zone tax incentives, including enhanced incentives for investment in eligible rural communities, will continue to boost private investment to underserved communities across America, building on tens of billions of private sector dollars already invested since these tax incentives were established by the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act. The current nomination period will determine which census tracts are eligible for new investment beginning January 1, 2027. Because new designations will occur only once every 10 years, jurisdictions that do not nominate an eligible tract during this window would not have another opportunity until the next designation cycle. The census tracts eligible for designation include some of the most distressed areas in the country, and designation as a QOZ can help attract new investment, create jobs, stimulate economic growth, and provide meaningful opportunities for residents. The poverty rate, median family income rate and other variables will be available in the CDFI Fund’s Community Investment Mapping System (CIMS) and on the Treasury Department’s data transparency page which is available here . On April 6, the Treasury Department and the IRS also released a list of 25,332 eligible census tracts for nomination, of which 8,334 are eligible for rural benefits enacted as part of the Working Families Tax Cuts. Additional information on nomination procedures was sent directly to the Governors and the Mayor of the District of Columbia. The list of eligible census tracts is available here . ###

Treasury Targets Criminal Facilitators Behind CJNG’s Cross‑Border Fuel Smuggling Schemes

U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Public Affairs Press Release: June 30, 2026 Contact: Treasury Public Affairs, Press@treasury.gov Treasury Targets Criminal Facilitators Behind CJNG’s Cross‑Border Fuel Smuggling Schemes Treasury Issues Alert on Cartel Fuel Smuggling and Tax Evasion Schemes on the U.S. Southern Border WASHINGTON —Today, the Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) and Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) announced multiple actions combatting fuel smuggling schemes linked to Cartel de Jalisco Nueva Generacion (CJNG), a violent drug cartel designated under both counternarcotics and counterterrorism authorities. OFAC has sanctioned two Mexican nationals and nine entities tied to a CJNG-linked fuel theft scheme—involving cross-border smuggling, falsified customs documents, and shell companies—to evade Mexican taxes while generating tens of millions of dollars annually for the cartel. In addition, FinCEN issued a supplemental Alert providing additional guidance on financial typologies and red flags indicative of CJNG and other Mexico-based transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) smuggling fuel from the United States into Mexico in schemes involving Mexican tax evasion. "Today's action highlights the extent to which Mexico's cartels are expanding beyond traditional drug trafficking to generate revenue for their criminal organizations, which continue to traffic deadly drugs that kill Americans," said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent . "Treasury's actions targeting these illicit revenue streams advance the Trump Administration's priority of dismantling these terrorist organizations and making America safe again." Today’s action reflects strong collaboration between OFAC and FinCEN, and was coordinated with a South Texas Homeland Security Task Force (HSTF)-led investigation involving the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Internal Revenue Service – Criminal Investigation (IRS-CI), Department of Commerce – Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), among others. OFAC and FinCEN work in close coordination with the HSTFs, which target the proliferation of illicit drugs and the networks, enablers, and financial mechanisms that support their production and distribution. Today’s sanctions were also developed jointly with the Government of Mexico’s financial intelligence unit, the Unidad de Inteligencia Financiera (UIF). Among those designated is Oscar Guillermo Juraidini Silva , who supports CJNG in a fuel smuggling enterprise that generates hundreds of millions of dollars each year. FinCEN’s Alert is one of several recent FinCEN advisory and analytic products on revenue streams and illicit activity associated with Mexico-based FTOs and other criminal organizations, to include the procurement of fentanyl precursor chemicals and fentanyl-related threat patterns and trends ; timeshare fraud ; human smuggling along the southwest border ; bulk cash smuggling ; Chinese money laundering networks and associated threat patterns and trends ; crude oil smuggling on the southwest border ; cross-border funds transfers involving illegal aliens ; human trafficking associated with the 2026 FIFA World Cup ; and non-work authorized populations and their employers and risks to the integrity of the U.S. financial system . CJNG: VIOLENT DRUG CARTEL AND FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATION CJNG is a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization (FTO) and specially designated global terrorist (SDGT) that is responsible for a significant proportion of fentanyl and other deadly drugs trafficked into the United States. On February 20, 2025 , the Department of State designated CJNG as an FTO and SDGT. Treasury previously sanctioned CJNG on April 8, 2015 pursuant to the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act and on December 15, 2021 pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14059, which targets the international proliferation of illicit drugs and their means of production. OFAC has taken numerous actions against CJNG-linked individuals and companies for enabling drug trafficking, money laundering, and corruption. In recent years, Mexico-based drug trafficking cartels like CJNG have become increasingly involved in the theft, adulteration, and smuggling of hydrocarbons, such as fuel and oil, in schemes colloquially referred to in Mexico as huachicol. These schemes have grown into powerful revenue generators for CJNG through the theft of tens of billions of dollars in lost revenue for the Mexican government and have enabled CJNG campaigns of narcotics trafficking in the United States, violence against Mexican government forces along the U.S. southwest border, and corruption within Mexico. Over the last two years, OFAC has taken a series of actions targeting cartel involvement in the illicit practice of huachicol , including on September 10, 2024 and on May 1, 2025 . Similarly, FinCEN’s May 2025 Alert provided financial typologies and red flags indicative of crude oil smuggling schemes on the U.S. southwest border associated with CJNG and other Mexico-based TCOs. In the 12-month period following this Alert, FinCEN received over 160 Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) that detailed over $7 billion in suspicious activity, sent primarily between the United States and Mexico and often involving Mexican cartels, most commonly CJNG. The most common U.S. states involved in the SARs are Texas and Florida. In Texas, the subjects were mostly located in cities and towns near the U.S.–Mexico border, including Brownsville, Mission, Eagle Pass, and McAllen with most subjects involved in the oil and natural gas and transportation industries. CRUDE CRIMINALS AND BEYOND: MEXICAN NORTHBOUND OIL SMUGGLING AND SOUTHBOUND FUEL SMUGGLING Huachicol -related activities are currently the most significant non-drug revenue source for Mexican cartels and other illicit actors. Huachicol -related activities generally encompass (1) fuel and oil theft in Mexico, (2) the smuggling of crude oil into the United States, and (3) the smuggling of fuel from the United States into Mexico involving Mexican tax evasion schemes known as fiscal fuel theft ( huachicol fiscal ). Thieves in Mexico (known as huachicoleros ) use a variety of means to steal fuel and crude oil from Mexico’s state-owned energy company, Petróleos Mexicanos (Pemex), including bribing corrupt Pemex employees, illegally drilling taps into pipelines, stealing from refineries, hijacking tanker trucks, and threatening Pemex employees. Fuel stolen from Pemex is sold on the black market around Mexico. As highlighted in FinCEN’s May 2025 Alert, stolen crude oil is smuggled into the United States through complicit Mexican brokers and often mislabeled as “waste oil” or other hazardous material to avoid scrutiny and evade taxes and regulations. The oil is then delivered to complicit U.S. importers in the oil and natural gas industry operating near the U.S. southwest border, who sell it at a steep discount on the U.S. and global energy markets before repatriating the significant illicit profits back to the cartels in Mexico. As FinCEN’s supplemental Alert highlights, fiscal fuel theft schemes involve Mexico-based cartels and their huachicoleros smuggling gasoline, diesel, naphtha, and other fuel from the United States across the southern border or U.S. ports into Mexico in schemes to evade Mexico’s import tax on fuel, known as I mpuesto Especial sobre Producción y Servicios (IEPS). Through these schemes, the cartels use complicit Mexican trading companies ( comercializadoras ) with fuel distribution permits from Mexico’s National Energy Commission (Comisión Nacional de Energía) to purchase fuel from complicit U.S. fuel distribution companies and issue false invoices to legitimize and commercialize the illicit fuel in Mexico. These brokers, however, lack the appropriate permits from Mexico’s Secretariat of Energy (Secretaría de Energía) to import fuel into Mexico. As part of the scheme, complicit U.S. fuel distributors leverage their relationships with major U.S. refineries and fuel distributors to purchase and then divert fuel to interconnected networks of U.S. and Mexican front and shell companies in the freight, logistics, and other industries before it is smuggled into Mexico via tanker trucks, railcars, and shadow fleets of maritime vessels. The Mexican cartels and their huachicoleros can evade the IEPS through various means, including misclassifying customs documentation, bribery of government officials, or other methods before transporting the fuel to storage yards under their control and then selling it within Mexico for a steep profit through cartel-controlled or affiliated gas stations and unregulated roadside fuel stops. Public reporting suggests that a quarter to a third of all fuel sold in Mexico may be illicit. According to FinCEN’s analysis of Bank Secrecy Act reporting, the Mexican cartels primarily use the brokers and their access to the Mexican financial system to send international wire transfers and digital asset payments to the complicit U.S. fuel distribution companies for the smuggled fuel — either directly or through shell companies acting as pass-through accounts. In other cases, the cartels may pay the complicit U.S. fuel distributors directly through structured cash deposits into their bank accounts with illicit proceeds from drug trafficking and other criminal activities in the United States as a form of trade-based money laundering. The complicit U.S. fuel distributors obfuscate these ill-gotten fuel sales through a variety of money laundering typologies including purchases of (i) luxury goods such as high-end vehicles, high-value jewelry or exclusive vacation rentals/travel destinations; (ii) real estate; and (iii) investment assets. In Mexico, the cartels use their illicit profits from the black market fuel sales to make cash payments to Mexican political campaigns and media outlets to help elect corrupt Mexican politicians willing to assist the cartels control key administrative positions in the government, which facilitates fuel smuggling operations and access to state contracts to launder the illicit profits from these schemes and other criminal activities. FRACTURING CJNG’S FUEL FACILITATORS Building upon OFAC’s prior actions, today OFAC designated Oscar Guillermo Juraidini Silva ( Juraidini ), who is a key business person facilitating CJNG’s fuel theft enterprise. Juraidini operates as an accountant and the mastermind behind certain financial operations for CJNG. Juraidini creates and operates shell companies on behalf of CJNG, and falsifies customs documents for CJNG to aid in the illicit cross-border transfer of fuel. Juraidini imports fuel from the United States into Mexico that is intentionally mislabeled in customs documentation to circumvent Mexican IEPS taxes. The majority of Juraidini’s clients are gas station companies, which receive the refined fuel products and sell them via retail gas stations. Juraidini generates tens of millions of dollars annually, benefiting CJNG. Juraidini owns six businesses in Mexico, operating in transportation, financial services, and real estate sectors. Juraidini’s Mexican companies include: Centro Cambiario La Peseta, S.A. de C.V. ; OJ Living Trust, S.A.P.I. de C.V. ; RK Real King, S.A. de C.V. ; Soma Transporte y Servicios, S.A. de C.V. ; Ogui Fletes ; and OF Transportes . In addition, Juraidini owns a business based in the United Kingdom, Cucumber Sweet Waves Ltd . OFAC designated Oscar Guillermo Juraidini Silva pursuant to E.O. 14059 and E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, CJNG. Additionally, OFAC designated the companies Centro Cambiario La Peseta, S.A. de C.V.; OJ Living Trust, S.A.P.I. de C.V.; RK Real King, S.A. de C.V.; Soma Transporte y Servicios, S.A. de C.V.; Ogui Fletes; OF Transportes; and Cucumber Sweet Waves Ltd pursuant to E.O. 14059 and E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Oscar Guillermo Juraidini Silva. Today, OFAC also designated J. Refugio Ruiz Villagomez , who plays a role in Jomadi Logistics & Cargo, S.A. de C.V. ( Jomadi ) and Ahavat Logistics Solution, S.A. de C.V. ( Ahavat ). J. Refugio Ruiz Villagomez has knowingly smuggled fuel from the United States into Mexico without proper permits. He pays fees to cartels and other criminal organizations that control ports of entry between the United States and Mexico. According to investigative findings made public by Mexico’s Attorney General’s office, Jomadi is an import and export company involved in huachicol fiscal . Jomadi and Ahavat have transacted through the U.S. financial system to the tune of tens of millions of dollars with third parties linked to CJNG that have been involved in huachicol -related activities. OFAC designated Jomadi Logistics & Cargo, S.A. de C.V. and Ahavat Logistics Solution, S.A. de C.V. pursuant to E.O. 14059 for having provided, or attempted to provide, financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services in support of, CJNG. Additionally, OFAC designated Jomadi Logistics & Cargo, S.A. de C.V. and Ahavat Logistics Solution, S.A. de C.V. pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, CJNG. OFAC also designated J. Refugio Ruiz Villagomez pursuant to E.O. 14059 and E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Jomadi Logistics & Cargo, S.A. de C.V. and Ahavat Logistics Solution, S.A. de C.V. SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated or blocked persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked persons. Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities involving designated or otherwise blocked persons. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated or blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person. Non-U.S. persons are also prohibited from causing or conspiring to cause U.S. persons to wittingly or unwittingly violate U.S. sanctions, as well as engaging in conduct that evades U.S. sanctions. Individuals located in the United States or abroad who provide information about sanctions violations to the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s whistleblower incentive program may be eligible for awards if the information they provide leads to a successful enforcement action that results in monetary penalties exceeding $1,000,000. Furthermore, engaging in certain transactions involving the persons designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, may risk the imposition of secondary sanctions on participating foreign financial institutions. OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on opening or maintaining, in the United States, a correspondent account or a payable-through account of a foreign financial institution that knowingly conducts or facilitates any significant transaction on behalf of a person who is designated pursuant to the relevant authority. The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC’s guidance on Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List . Click here to view a chart on the persons designated today . Click here for more information on the persons designated today . ###

Treasury Sanctions Networks Fueling Sudan’s Civil War and Worsening Humanitarian Crisis

U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Public Affairs Press Release: June 26, 2026 Contact: Treasury Public Affairs, Press@treasury.gov Treasury Sanctions Networks Fueling Sudan’s Civil War and Worsening Humanitarian Crisis WASHINGTON — Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed sanctions on eight individuals and entities linked to procurement and recruitment networks that continue to fuel Sudan’s devastating civil war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary group, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). These networks have enabled both sides to expand the scale and intensity of the conflict, contributing to one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises and further destabilizing an already fragile region. The ongoing violence has also created conditions that allow for terrorist groups to grow, posing threats to the security and interests of the United States. “The Trump Administration is committed to advancing a lasting peace in Sudan and bringing an end to the conflict,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent . “The networks profiting from the conflict in Sudan jeopardize the prospects for the humanitarian truce that the Sudanese people desperately need.” The United States calls on the SAF and the RSF to accept and implement an immediate, unconditional three-month humanitarian truce. Such a truce would allow additional humanitarian assistance to reach those in need, safeguard civilian populations, and create space for further negotiations toward a permanent ceasefire. The United States again calls on external actors to cease all financial and military support to the parties involved in the conflict. Today’s action was taken pursuant to Executive Order (E.O.) 14098, “Imposing Sanctions on Certain Persons Destabilizing Sudan and Undermining the Goal of a Democratic Transition.” OFAC’s investigation of the individuals and entities designated today was conducted in close partnership with the United States Customs and Border Protection, National Targeting Center. SAF PROCUREMENT COMPANIES AND SUPPLIER The Defense Industries System (DIS), Sudan’s largest defense enterprise, supports and maintains the SAF’s arsenal of arms, ammunition, vehicles, and material, often acquired from Iran and other external backers. DIS controls numerous subsidiaries, including the Sudanese conglomerate, Giad Industrial Group (Giad)—also known as Sudan Master Technology—through complex and opaque structures from which DIS has generated billions of dollars. OFAC designated DIS and Giad on June 1, 2023 . DIS’s acquisition of military equipment and related material has enabled the SAF to sustain combat operations against the RSF, conduct attacks against civilians, and reject and obstruct efforts to cease hostilities and achieve a ceasefire. Target Multiactivities Company Ltd. (TMAC) is a Sudan-based company controlled by DIS through Giad. With senior DIS officer Tariq Hussain Muhammad Madani ( Madani ) serving as managing director, TMAC has imported explosives and related material into Sudan from Egyptian and Indian companies, including India-based explosives manufacturer, SBL Energy Limited (SBL). These explosives are subsequently used in bombs deployed by the SAF. SBL, whose chief executive officer is Indian national Alok Choudhari ( Choudhari ), has supplied TMAC with over 200 shipments of explosives and explosives-related materiel since 2024. Ports Engineering Company LTD (Ports Engineering) is a Sudan-based public construction company owned by Sudanese state-owned enterprises, including Giad. Since the start of the conflict in April 2023, Ports Engineering has imported uniforms and footwear worn by Sudanese intelligence personnel from an Emirati company, and ammunition belts and boxes of weapons from a Turkish company. OFAC designated TMAC pursuant to E.O. 14098 for being a foreign person who is owned or controlled by, or has acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, DIS, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14098. OFAC designated Madani pursuant to E.O. 14098 for being a foreign person who is or has been a leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors of TMAC, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14098 relating to the tenure of such leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors. OFAC designated SBL pursuant to E.O. 14098 for being a foreign person who has materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, TMAC, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14098. OFAC designated Choudhari pursuant to E.O. 14098 for being a foreign person who is or has been a leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors of SBL, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14098 relating to the tenure of such leader, official, senior executive officer, or member of the board of directors. OFAC designated Ports Engineering pursuant to E.O. 14098 for being a foreign person who is owned or controlled by, or has acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Sudan Master Technology, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14098. COLOMBIAN RECRUITING NETWORK ASSOCIATES OFAC took action in December 2025 and April 2026 against a transnational network led by retired Colombian military officer Alvaro Andres Quijano Becerra (Quijano) and his wife, Claudia Viviana Oliveros Forero (Oliveros), who have been recruiting former Colombian military personnel to fight in Sudan for the RSF, an armed group that has committed genocide. Quijano and Oliveros have carried out this scheme using companies under their control, including Colombia-based companies International Services Agency (A4SI) and Fénix Human Resources S.A.S., and Panama-based company, Talent Bridge, S.A. (formerly known as Global Staffing S.A.), which was used to minimize A4SI’s legal exposure and obfuscate the links between A4SI and the company hiring the Colombian fighters. Panamanian nationals Enrique Daniel Palacios Quintanilla (Palacios) and Jack Peter Derman Guzman (Derman), and Colombian national Fredy Alejandro Lopez Ocampo (Lopez) were associated with Talent Bridge S.A. dating back to the company’s creation in 2022, each holding official roles. Palacios served as a resident agent, director, and secretary. Derman served as a director, subscriber, empowered representative, and treasurer, and he succeeded Oliveros as president in July 2025, which is when the company rebranded as Talent Bridge, S.A. Lopez served as a secretary, director, and subscriber. OFAC designated Palacios, Derman, and Lopez pursuant to E.O. 14098 for being foreign persons who are or have been leaders, officials, senior executive officers, or members of the board of directors of Talent Bridge, S.A., an entity whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 14098 relating to the tenure of such leaders, officials, senior executive officers, or members of the board of directors SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated or blocked persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked persons. Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities involving designated or otherwise blocked persons. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated or blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person. Non-U.S. persons are also prohibited from causing or conspiring to cause U.S. persons to wittingly or unwittingly violate U.S. sanctions, as well as engaging in conduct that evades U.S. sanctions. Individuals located in the U.S. or abroad who provide information about sanctions violations to Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network whistleblower incentive program may be eligible for awards if the information they provide leads to a successful enforcement action that results in monetary penalties exceeding $1,000,000. The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC’s guidance on Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List . Click here for more information on the persons designated today . ###

Treasury Sanctions Rwandan Gold Refinery and Network Enabling Illicit Conflict Minerals Trade

U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Public Affairs Press Release: June 25, 2026 Contact: Treasury Public Affairs, Press@treasury.gov Treasury Sanctions Rwandan Gold Refinery and Network Enabling Illicit Conflict Minerals Trade WASHINGTON —Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) imposed sanctions on a network working in coordination with the Rwandan-backed March 23 Movement (M23) to illegally smuggle minerals from eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to Rwanda. This action supports the historic U.S.-brokered Washington Accords for Peace and Prosperity , signed on December 4, 2025, by the leaders of the DRC and Rwanda. It reinforces their commitment to implement a Regional Economic Integration Framework designed to expand trade and investment, strengthen transparency across critical minerals supply chains, and lay the foundation for greater long-term economic opportunity throughout the region. “The United States will not allow rogue groups to profit from the illicit mineral trade and destabilize the region,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent . “The Democratic Republic of the Congo’s mineral wealth rightfully belongs to the Congolese people. Under President Trump’s leadership, we will continue to take decisive action against those who enable violence, exploitation, and attacks against the Congolese people.” M23—designated by both the United States and the United Nations as an armed group—has committed numerous human rights abuses and continues to undermine regional peace efforts. M23’s control and trafficking of illicit minerals directly fuel its destabilizing operations and further exacerbates the humanitarian crisis in the DRC. CONFLICT MINERALS: FUNDING VIOLENCE AND UNDERMINING GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS The United States is a key partner to the DRC and Rwanda in implementing the vision of the Washington Accords brokered by President Trump to achieve lasting peace and establish a fully licit and transparent regional minerals sector. Disrupting conflict mineral networks and encouraging all supply chain actors to exercise greater due diligence is necessary to create the space for the DRC, Rwanda, and other partners to build a new system that will reinforce peace, drive economic growth for the people of the region, and contribute to secure global supply chains. On August 12, 2025 , Treasury took action against a network of entities linked to illegal mining in the DRC. As Treasury highlighted in that designation, the trafficking of conflict minerals is linked to violence and abuses against civilians and impedes responsible and legal investment in the region that would benefit local communities. Treasury has taken several actions targeting actors driving the conflict in eastern DRC since Rwanda and the DRC signed the Washington Accords, including on March 2, 2026 , April 30, 2026 , and most recently on June 2, 2026 . As Treasury highlighted in these previous designations, M23 has captured large portions of territory in eastern DRC, including the capitals of North and South Kivu provinces, Goma and Bukavu, with direct military, financial, and logistical support from the military of Rwanda, known as the Rwanda Defence Force (RDF). OFAC sanctioned the RDF on March 2, 2026 for actively supporting, training, and fighting alongside M23, including supporting M23 as it seized these critical regions in eastern DRC. These regions are home to strategic mining sites that are rich in mineral wealth rightfully belonging to the Congolese people, and M23 has exploited this wealth to purchase weapons and equipment, pay fighters, and commit abuses targeting Congolese civilians. On July 8, 2024, the U.S. Department of State highlighted concerns with the illicit trade and exploitation of certain minerals that contribute to ongoing instability in eastern DRC. The United States remains concerned about the conflict and humanitarian crisis in eastern DRC, as well as the role that the illicit trade of minerals continues to play in financing the conflict. In many cases, minerals sourced from eastern DRC are smuggled through Rwanda before being transported to major refining and processing countries, such as China. Minerals sourced from conflict-affected areas directly or indirectly benefit armed groups, who raise funds by selling minerals and imposing illegal “taxation” schemes, often in collusion with corrupt local officials. In addition, the mines controlled by armed groups like M23 are linked to a wide range of human rights abuse, such as forced labor, child labor, and sexual and gender-based violence, as well as dangerous working conditions, as evidenced by the March 2026 collapse of a mine shaft at the M23-controlled Rubaya coltan mine in eastern DRC that killed over 200 people, including children. MINERALS LAUNDERING SCHEME Since M23’s take over of the provincial capitals, Gasabo Gold Refinery LTD ( Gasabo Gold ) has acted as a key partner to Rwandan government officials and M23 rebels as they sourced and transported gold out of eastern DRC. Following the removal of gold from mines in RDF/M23-occupied areas in South Kivu, Rwandan government forces have had strict oversight of the gold until it reached Gasabo Gold. RDF soldiers and M23 rebels have ensured the safe transport of gold from M23-held areas to Rusizi District, Rwanda, immediately over the border from Bukavu, DRC to Gasabo Gold in Kigali, Rwanda, via ground or air transport. Upon reaching Gasabo Gold, RDF and M23 personnel have handed the gold over to Gasabo Gold personnel, who immediately began the gold refinement process. In early 2026 at least 60 kg of gold, representing millions of dollars in value, were moved from eastern DRC to Gasabo Gold through this scheme. The European Union previously designated Gasabo Gold for its role in transporting illegally extracted gold from the DRC. Jean Malic Kalima ( Kalima ) is the Chairman of Gasabo Gold, while Bosco Kayobotsi runs its day-to-day operations as General Manager. Kalima also controls the Rwandan mining companies Bugambira Mines LTD ( Bugambira Mines ), Wolfram Mining and Processing LTD ( Wolfram Mining ), and Rwinkwavu Mining Corporation LTD ( Rwinkwavu Mining ). Gasabo Gold is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13413, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, logistical, or technological support for, or goods or services in support of, M23. In addition, Gasabo Gold is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13413, as amended, for being responsible for or complicit in, or having engaged in, directly or indirectly, support to persons, including armed groups, involved in activities that threaten the peace, security, or stability of the Democratic Republic of the Congo or that undermine democratic processes or institutions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, through the illicit trade in natural resources of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. Kalima and Kayobotsi are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13413, as amended, for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Gasabo Gold. Bugambira Mines, Wolfram Mining, and Rwinkwavu Mining are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13413, as amended, for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Kalima. SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated or blocked person described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked persons. Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities involving designated or otherwise blocked persons. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated or blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person. Non-U.S. persons are also prohibited from causing or conspiring to cause U.S. persons to wittingly or unwittingly violate U.S. sanctions, as well as engaging in conduct that evades U.S. sanctions. Individuals located in the U.S. or abroad who provide information about sanctions violations to Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network whistleblower incentive program may be eligible for awards if the information they provide leads to a successful enforcement action that results in monetary penalties exceeding $1,000,000. The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List (SDN List), but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC’s guidance on Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List . Click here for more information on the person designated today . ###

Treasury Concludes the Artificial Intelligence Innovation Series

U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Public Affairs Press Release: June 24 , 2026 Contact: Treasury Public Affairs, Press@Treasury.gov Treasury Concludes the Artificial Intelligence Innovation Series WASHINGTON — The U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC) and the Artificial Intelligence (AI) Transformation Office (AITO) held the fourth and final roundtable of the AI Innovation Series on May 19, 2026. This public-private initiative supports the continued strength and resilience of the U.S. financial system in an era of accelerating technological change. “The global economy is undergoing a period of rapid transformation with breakthrough advances in AI,” said Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent . “The AI Innovation Series discussions reinforced that countries that deploy this technology most effectively will shape the next era of growth, and under the guidance of President Trump, America will continue to lead the way. We will continue working with the financial sector to ensure that regulatory approaches keep pace with technological developments and enable responsible AI adoption that enhances the strength of the U.S. financial system.” “Through the Innovation Series, we convened industry leaders and regulators to ensure that policy initiatives facilitate AI adoption without compromising safety and soundness. In the financial services sector, regulatory frameworks built for a different era can result in a reluctance to innovate, and that reluctance in itself can become a source of financial stability risk,” said Christina Skinner, Deputy Assistant Secretary for FSOC . “As the roundtable discussions emphasized, when financial institutions cannot deploy tools that enhance their security, resilience, and global competitiveness, the economy as a whole suffers.” “AI adoption is moving from experimentation to implementation across both the public and private sectors,” said Paras Malik, Treasury’s Chief AI Officer and Counselor to the Secretary . “As participants highlighted throughout the AI Innovation Series, the challenge is no longer defining AI strategies—it is operationalizing them at scale. As AI becomes increasingly embedded in financial services, maintaining trust, resilience, and effective governance will be essential. Treasury will continue engaging with industry, regulators, and technology leaders to better understand how these capabilities are being deployed and their implications for the financial system.” BACKGROUND The AI Innovation Series convened a variety of financial institutions, technology firms, and regulators for cross-sector dialogue on high-value AI use cases, practical approaches to scaling innovation, and regulatory impediments to adoption. Roundtable participants highlighted AI’s potential to support financial stability and drive economic growth; enhance productivity; and combat increasingly sophisticated cyber-attacks, fraud, and financial crimes. They emphasized the need for governance and regulatory frameworks to evolve alongside the rapid technological change. They also requested greater regulatory clarity and harmonization as well as continued public-private engagement to support responsible innovation. AI INNOVATION SERIES The AI Innovation Series supports Treasury’s implementation of Executive Order 14179 , “Removing Barriers to American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence,” and the Administration’s AI Action Plan. The initiative consisted of four roundtables from March through May focused on AI strategy and governance, value generation and efficiency, cybersecurity and risk management considerations, and financial stability and economic security implications. Insights from the roundtables will inform Treasury’s and FSOC’s ongoing efforts to ensure that regulatory policy encourages innovation, enhances financial stability, and maintains U.S. leadership globally. Additional information on the AI Innovation Series, including readouts from each roundtable, is available here . ###

Sec. Bessent at Economic Club of New York’s America 250 Gala Dinner: American Economic Statecraft in the 21st Century

U.S. Department of the Treasury Office of Public Affairs Press Release: June 23, 2026 Contact: Treasury Public Affairs, Press@treasury.gov Remarks from Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent at The Economic Club of New York’s America 250 Gala Dinner: American Economic Statecraft in the 21st Century As prepared for delivery. Thank you for the invitation to be here on this wonderful occasion. As a long-time member of the Economic Club of New York, I know that it occupies a place of great significance in our nation’s discourse. For generations, few institutions have done more to shape how we confront the defining questions of the day. And yet, across all those years, tonight’s gathering is without precedent as we assemble on the eve of an extraordinary moment in our history. Over the coming days, we will celebrate 250 years of the American story and the proposition with which it began: that a free people answer to no power but their own. But milestones of this magnitude demand more than ceremony. They ask something of us. They invite us to reflect on the creation of our country, of course, but no less, on its condition. Indeed, the most fitting way to honor those who founded this nation is to meet the great challenges of our own time with the same resolve that they brought to theirs. And in that spirit, under President Trump’s leadership, the U.S. Treasury is working to restore economic security as the foundation that allows a nation to fulfill its most basic obligations. In my remarks before the Economic Club of Dallas, I detailed how the structural vulnerabilities that we allowed to accumulate over time precipitated a drift into dependence. And last month before the Reagan Library, I noted that under President Trump, America has awoken to the risks we can no longer ignore and is now attuned to the responsibilities we can no longer neglect. So tonight, I would like to take the next step and describe our strategy for economic statecraft, by which I mean the disciplined use of America’s economic power in service of our sovereignty. For the better part of a century, the United States was the principal architect and guarantor of an open global economic system that delivered enormous benefits. It raised our allies from the ruins of war, widened the channels of global trade, lifted standards of living, and attained a position of influence that remains unmatched in modern history. But the success of a system does not absolve us from revisiting its assumptions. America shaped the postwar order in a world in which our overriding task was to help allies rebuild their economies and defend against the specter of communism. We accepted asymmetries because they served a larger strategic purpose. We opened our market because it helped to create a more prosperous world. And we tolerated imbalances because American economic strength appeared unassailable. Over time, however, those choices hardened into habits. Habits into assumptions. And assumptions, left unexamined, into vulnerabilities. We came to believe that access to the American market could be extended without condition—and therefore without consequence. We assumed that closer economic integration would result in a greater convergence of interests. That supply chains would function in every crisis. Low prices would compensate for lost capacity. And above all, that other countries would treat our firms as fairly as we had treated theirs. Of course, those assumptions failed to materialize. Some slowly, others all at once. In recent decades, we’ve watched strategic industries migrate abroad; critical supply chains concentrate in jurisdictions that do not share our interests; foreign subsidies, forced technology transfer, discriminatory taxation, and non-market practices distort competition; and American firms grow to global scale, only to become targets of policies designed to constrain or replace them. Beneath each of those outcomes lay an economic policy that became unmoored from our national strategy. We’ve emboldened other countries to exploit our dependence as leverage. And to repair those imbalances with the world is not to retreat from it. On the contrary, it is to engage on terms that make America stronger. It is to insist on trade that is fair, reciprocal, and consistent with our national interest. And it is to more closely bind what we should have never allowed to cleave: our economic and national security. So tonight, guided by these priorities, I want to organize our approach to economic statecraft under President Trump around five core principles. The first is that economic security begins with national capacity. We have rediscovered at great cost what Hamilton taught us around the time of our founding: that every nation “ought to endeavor to possess within itself all the essentials of national supply.” That our strength, in other words, is derived from what we can build, for the nation that cannot produce what it needs is not truly secure. The nation that depends on its adversaries for critical inputs is not truly sovereign. And the nation that reduces its economics to consumption is not truly prosperous. Instead, as Hamilton put it, it is essential to “[enlarge] the sphere of our domestic commerce,” because economic security begins at home. It begins with the capacity to build, invent, finance, and scale the industries that will define the next century, among them semiconductors, AI, quantum computing, advanced manufacturing, shipbuilding, critical minerals, and pharmaceuticals, to name only a few. More than sectors of the economy, these are the sources of national power. And America must lead in each of them. In today’s economy, supply chains are the domain in which that leadership is tested. Yet for years, the question that seemed to consume both our political and commercial class was: Where is the lowest cost? That question still matters, but it is no longer sufficient. We must also ask: Can this supply chain survive a crisis? Can it withstand coercion? Can it continue operating during a pandemic, cyberattack, war, or financial shock? Does it depend on a country that could use economic leverage against us? Does it expose American firms to intellectual property theft? Does it leave our military, hospitals, energy system, or financial system vulnerable? Of course, supply chain resilience does not require every component to be domestic from beginning to end. That would be unrealistic and unnecessary. But it does compel us to know where our vulnerabilities are and to reduce them before a crisis rears itself. It requires diversifying away from dangerous concentrations. And that we build enough capacity at home to ensure that the American people are never at the mercy of a foreign chokepoint abroad. The second principle is that America’s openness will be matched by reciprocity, which is the basis of durable cooperation. No economic relationship can remain healthy if one side opens its market while the other closes its own. No partnership can remain sustainable if American workers and firms are asked to absorb imbalances in the name of harmony. And no open system can survive if that openness is exploited by countries that do not practice it themselves. The United States remains the best economic partner in the world. To partner with us is to gain access to the deepest, most dynamic markets; the preeminent role of our dollar; and an ecosystem of innovation that has pushed the boundaries of the possible for two and a half centuries. Those benefits are substantial. But under President Trump, they are no longer unconditional. Countries cannot seek access to our market while denying fair access to theirs. They cannot invite American capital while imposing discriminatory taxes and investment obligations aimed at American companies. They cannot benefit from American security while adopting industrial policies that exclude American technology. They cannot ask American firms to invest, hire, and innovate, and then require those firms to localize intellectual property, transfer know-how, or satisfy indigenous innovation requirements designed to favor domestic champions. And they cannot participate in the dollar-based financial system while serving as conduits for the evasion of sanctions, illicit finance, or strategic leakage. America welcomes its partners and we are stronger because of them. But our partnership now carries expectations. And, in some instances, non-negotiable obligations. Of course, we will continue to distinguish legitimate regulation from discrimination. Every sovereign nation has the right to regulate in ways that serve its own public interest. The United States respects that responsibility. But regulation descends into discrimination when it targets American firms because they are American. Taxation becomes retribution when it is structured to single out American companies. And industrial policy is wielded as a tool of exclusion when it uses local-content rules, forced localization, procurement bias, or indigenous innovation requirements to shut American firms out of fair competition. These differences are not difficult to discern. And the United States possesses many tools at its disposal to remedy practices that distort trade and undermine reciprocity. We will always seek to use those tools judiciously—but we will never hesitate to use them decisively. The third principle is that America will write the rules of the next economy. Of course, unlike much of the last century, the next era of economic competition will not be confined to the movement of goods across oceans and ports. It will be shaped by the platforms, systems, and protocols through which commerce flows in the twenty-first century. In each of these domains, standards can become strategy, for the nation that fails to help write the rules of the next economy will sooner or later answer to those that did. If authoritarian or mercantilist systems write those standards for their own advantage, the global economy will become more coercive and less favorable to American interests. If America and our partners set open, secure, market-based standards, then the twenty-first century economy will tilt toward freedom and prosperity by rewarding innovation, protecting intellectual property, and ensuring that competition is not distorted by discrimination. That is the system America should champion. And it is the system that our partners have every reason to build together with us. I think, for example, of the new frontiers in financial technologies. Digital assets, stablecoins, tokenization, and new payment systems will help to shape the future of money. The United States should not consign itself to the sidelines while that future is built elsewhere. We should support innovation that strengthens the dollar, improves efficiency, expands access, and preserves the integrity of the financial system. And we should insist that new technologies meet our standards for transparency, security, consumer protection, and law enforcement access. The fourth principle is that financial leadership is a central instrument of statecraft. And as Treasury Secretary, I see its workings every day. There is nothing accidental about the dollar’s place in the world. Its broad usage reflects the depth of our markets, the strength of our rule of law, the credibility of our institutions, and the scale of our economy. Of course, that leadership role bestows enormous advantages, among them lower borrowing costs, deeper capital markets, enhanced sanctions capabilities, and great influence across the global financial system. But it also imposes obligations that we cannot ignore. Sanctions evasion, terrorist finance, proliferation finance, cybercrime, narcotics trafficking, and corruption all exploit weaknesses in the financial system. Treasury’s job is to protect the integrity of the financial system by rooting out these abuses—and to deploy this power with discipline. Sanctions must be targeted, enforceable, and connected to strategy. And they must be paired with diplomacy, compliance, intelligence, and coordination with partners. The fifth and most important principle is that economic statecraft must serve the American people. The purpose of American economic statecraft is to connect national power with household prosperity. We need an economy in which our working families are not merely consumers of what the world produces, but participants in what America builds. An economy in which no community is asked to accept permanent decline as the cost of global efficiency. An economy in which the gains of national strength are broadly shared beyond the boardrooms and trading floors to the families and communities who sustain it. America’s competitive advantage has never been confined to the bounty of our natural resources or the depth of our capital markets. It has always resided in the character and the capacity of our people; the entrepreneur with the temerity to turn an idea into an enterprise, the worker with the ability to master new trades and new technologies that didn’t exist a decade ago, and the institutions that allow their freedom and confidence to flourish. The purpose of economic statecraft is to restore that confidence. It is to affirm to the American people that our openness and strength can go together. That partnership abroad can reinforce prosperity at home. That we can retain the dynamism of our markets while defending the foundations of our national interests. That America can welcome investment and trade without accepting dependency or decline. So, what should the world expect from the United States? Our partners should expect clarity. They should expect a nation committed to strong alliances and productive economic relationships. A nation that welcomes fair competition, rewards investment, and believes in open commerce. But they should also expect a nation that is now more aware of its interests—and more prepared to protect them. A nation that insists on reciprocity. That shields its firms from discriminatory treatment. Secures its critical supply chains. Enforces sanctions and combats illicit finance. A United States, in short, that will not allow economic policy to grow detached from national strategy. Our adversaries, meanwhile, should expect resolve. Attempts to weaponize supply chains, steal technology, evade sanctions, manipulate markets, or coerce our partners will not go unanswered. We will build resilience before crises occur. We will work with partners wherever possible. And we will act whenever necessary. Finally, the American people should expect that the Trump Administration will continue to put their security and prosperity first. They should expect policy that rewards work, investment, production, and innovation. Leadership that understands how productive capacity is power. An economy whose success is measured not merely by what it produces, but by whom it lifts. These are not new ambitions. Indeed, they are among the most abiding ones we hold. So as we approach a great national milestone, we would do well to remember that our founders left us more than a Republic; they bequeathed a roadmap powerful enough to sustain it for two and a half centuries. Of course, our founders scarcely could have foreseen the world we inhabit today. The industries we have built. The technologies we have invented. The prosperity we have created. Or the power we have come to attain. But what they did understand was something far more enduring: that the fortunes of a nation are shaped by the energies of its people. That great insight has been the source of America’s strength since its founding. It’s what transformed a small republic on the edge of a continent into the most prosperous nation over the long sweep of human civilization. It now falls on us to preserve that inheritance, not by seeking a smaller role in the world, but a stronger foundation for our leadership. Not by seeking conflict, but by insisting on fair competition. By ensuring that our openness serves to strengthen America, and the partnerships we form are worthy of the name. Those are reasonable expectations for any nation. They are also necessary ones for the United States, for we have been, and will remain, the most important economic partner in the world. But we are now a partner with higher standards and greater expectations. We are a partner that has regained knowledge of the value that we offer—and the will, once again, to defend it. That is American economic statecraft in the twenty-first century. Open to the world while anchored at home. Confident in our strengths and clear-eyed about our interests. And committed, above all, to the security, prosperity, and freedom of our people for the next 250 years and well beyond. Thank you. ###

Treasury Further Dismantles Overseas Scam Operations Targeting Americans

U.S. Department of th e Treasury Office of Public Affairs Press Release: June 23 , 2026 Contact: Treasury Public Affairs, Press@Treasury.gov Treasury Further Dismantles Overseas Scam Operations Targeting Americans WASHINGTON — Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury took coordinated action to further disrupt the Prince Group Transnational Criminal Organization (Prince Group TCO). The Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) sanctioned nine individuals and 26 entities linked to Prince Group TCO, including TCO leadership, investors in scam compounds, and front companies. In parallel, Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) proposed amending its October 2025 Huione Group Final Rule to include H-Pay Service PLC and any successor entity. Huione Group served as a critical node for laundering proceeds of cyber heists and virtual currency investment scams and was used by the Prince Group to transfer and consolidate scam-derived assets. “Scam centers in Southeast Asia steal billions of dollars from American victims each year,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent . “The Trump Administration is united in its efforts to dismantle these overseas criminal enterprises, and Treasury will continue using its tools to disrupt the networks behind this egregious fraud and protect Americans.” Together, today’s actions build on Treasury’s October 2025 designation of Prince Group TCO and guard against Huione Group’s attempts to circumvent being cut off from the U.S. financial system. On October 14, 2025, OFAC, in coordination with the United Kingdom’s (UK) Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office, designated Prince Group as a TCO for its role in a global criminal enterprise built on scam compounds, fraud, and money laundering. Prince Group TCO members own and reap substantial profits from scam compounds where fraud operations target victims in the United States and around the world. Prior to its designation, Prince Group TCO oversaw a worldwide money laundering network and invested criminal proceeds across a wide range of businesses, including real estate, aviation, and luxury cigars. Following Treasury’s action, countries around the world mobilized against this vicious syndicate, seizing properties, making arrests, and freezing assets with a combined value in the billions of dollars. In January, Chen Zhi, the leader of Prince Group TCO and mastermind behind its sprawling criminal empire, was stripped of his titles and Cambodian citizenship. This action was taken in coordination with the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s New York and San Francisco Field Offices. The FBI San Francisco Field Office today seized infrastructure used by Huione Group to scam Americans. FinCEN appreciates the contributions of the Australian Transaction Reports and Analysis Centre (AUSTRAC) in achieving this outcome. OFAC’s action today was also taken in close coordination with Japan’s National Police Agency. These actions are being taken in furtherance of President Trump’s Executive Order (E.O.) 14390 of March 6, 2026, “Combating Cybercrime, Fraud, and Predatory Schemes Against American Citizens,” which orders the U.S. Government to unleash every available tool to stop foreign-backed criminal networks that exploit vulnerable Americans through cybercrime, cyber-enabled fraud, and extortion. As such, today’s action further reflects OFAC’s coordination with the Homeland Security Task Force and National Coordination Center. OFAC is designating these 35 targets pursuant to E.O. 13581 (“Blocking Property of Transnational Criminal Organizations”), as amended by E.O. 13863 (“E.O. 13581, as amended”). In addition to the October 2025 designation of the Prince Group TCO, OFAC’s action today builds on other Treasury-wide efforts to disrupt scam operators based in Cambodia. Previous actions include OFAC’s April 23, 2026 designation of Cambodian senator Kok An and his criminal network, the September 8, 2025 designation of 12 companies and seven individuals based in Cambodia and Burma for their roles in facilitating human trafficking and cyber scams targeting U.S. persons, and OFAC’s September 12, 2024 designation of Cambodian tycoon Ly Yong Phat, his conglomerate L.Y.P. Group, and four of his hotels and resorts. Treasury continues to take these actions in close coordination with our international partners to address the shared threat posed by scam centers. Treasury will also continue to take aggressive steps to prevent illicit abuse of the digital asset industry, given its crucial role in global innovation and economic development. SOPHISTICATED SCAMS TARGETING AMERICANS Transnational criminal organizations based in Southeast Asia, like the Prince Group TCO and with support of their enablers like Huione Group, continue to target Americans through large-scale cyber-enabled fraud and scam operations. A U.S. government estimate reported that Americans lost at least $10 billion in 2024 to Southeast Asia-based scam operations, a 66 percent increase over the prior year. While these operations employ a variety of techniques to cheat victims out of their savings, one of the most common and lucrative schemes involves digital asset investment fraud. According to FinCEN’s September 2023 alert on these scams, perpetrators send text messages directly to potential targets’ phones and often use the promise of potential romantic relationships or friendships to gain the trust of their victims. They then convince their targets to make purported “investments” in digital assets on websites that are designed to look like legitimate investment platforms but are actually controlled by the scammers themselves. Ultimately, these scammers steal the funds deposited on the platforms under their control. Southeast Asia-based criminal organizations often recruit individuals to work in scam centers under false pretenses, such as by offering fake technology or customer service jobs at the centers’ connected casinos, resorts, and front companies. Once the individuals arrive at the compounds, the operators confiscate their passports and use debt bondage, physical violence, the threat of forced prostitution, and other methods to coerce them to scam strangers online. The scam operators specifically look to recruit individuals with English language skills to target American victims. Former scammers have reported they were directed to specifically target Americans, and some even had quotas for the number of targets per day. Individual U.S. victims of these scams have in some cases lost their entire life savings. Additional information on digital asset investment scams and the risks they pose can be found in Treasury’s 2026 National Money Laundering Risk Assessment . TARGETING PRINCE GROUP TCO'S SECOND-IN-COMMAND Today’s action targets Hu Xiaowei (Hu), who has been described as Prince Group TCO’s “second-in-command” and as a “big brother” to Prince Group TCO’s leader, Chen Zhi. Hu was previously designated by OFAC in October 2025 under one of his aliases, Chen Xiao’er. He is also known by the names Hu Shi and Wu An Ming. Hu’s activities on behalf of Prince Group TCO reportedly include setting up and supervising certain of the TCO’s subsidiary entities outside of Cambodia; conducting Prince Group TCO-related activities pertaining to aircraft; playing a role in Prince Group TCO-related transnational real estate activities; conducting illicit gambling activities; and owning companies that were ultimately controlled by Prince Group TCO leader Chen Zhi. Hu controls three companies in the British Virgin Islands: Eagle Fortitude Limited , Leisure Focus Limited , and Future King Inc. (Future King). Through Future King, Hu owns a large network of companies that he uses to manage funds and properties. These companies include two co-located Hong Kong-based asset management firms, China Reserve Securities Limited (China Reserve Securities) and Future Wing Financial Company Limited (Future Wing). Future Wing received millions of dollars of funds that have been assessed to have been derived from cryptocurrency investment scam victims. Future King also owns Singapore-based Future Oasis Pte. Ltd. (Future Oasis) and Hong Kong-based companies Future Cosmos Limited , Future Cosmos One Limited , Future Cosmos Two Limite d , CN Crystal Limited , and CN Breeze Limited . OFAC is designating Hu pursuant to E.O. 13581, as amended, for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Prince Group TCO, a person whose property and interests in property are blocked pursuant to E.O. 13581, as amended. OFAC is also designating Eagle Fortitude Limited, Leisure Focus Limited, Future King, China Reserve Securities, Future Wing, Future Oasis, Future Cosmos Limited, Future Cosmos One Limited, Future Cosmos Two Limited, CN Crystal Limited, and CN Breeze Limited pursuant to E.O. 13581, as amended, for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Hu. Hu uses a group of Hong Kong-based subordinates to run his web of companies. Several of these individuals have extensive histories as directors or officers in multiple Hu-controlled companies. Ho Ho Ming (Ho), Kong Ka On (Kong), and Li Hui (Li) are some of Hu’s main subordinates. Ho is an officer of China Reserve Securities, Future Wing, and Future Oasis; Kong is an officer of Future Cosmos; and Li is an officer of Future Wing. Kong also controls one Hong Kong-based company — Tycoon Yachts (HK) Limited — and 11 UK-based companies: Rocket Sandbox Ltd , DTX Winners Club Limited , Luffa Technology Network Company Limited , Cuban Trading UK Ltd , Halo Network Technology Ltd , Fortune Network Technology Ltd , Charco Charco Holborn Limited , Terra Cotta Warriors Isle of Dogs Ltd , Mingmen London Ltd , Chasca London Limited , and East Link London Ltd . OFAC is designating Ho, Kong, and Li pursuant to E.O. 13581, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods or services to or in support of, Hu. Tycoon Yachts (HK) Limited, Rocket Sandbox Ltd, DTX Winners Club Limited, Luffa Technology Network Company Limited, Cuban Trading UK Ltd, Halo Network Technology Ltd, Fortune Network Technology Ltd, Charco Charco Holborn Limited, Terra Cotta Warriors Isle of Dogs Ltd, Mingmen London Ltd, Chasca London Limited, and East Link London Ltd are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13581, as amended, for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Kong. Brendon Luo (Luo) and Qiu Weiren (Qiu) were major investors in a Prince Group TCO scam compound used to facilitate fraud operations. Dai An (Dai) is a high-level leader in the Prince Group TCO and has held an official position in Prince Huan Yu Real Estate Cambodia Group Co., Ltd., a company previously designated by OFAC for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Prince Holding Group. Fang Zhizhen (Fang) has been involved with the Prince Group’s online payment gateways for scams and laundered money for the TCO’s scam center proceeds. Chen Bo (Chen) is a director of at least six Prince Group TCO companies that were designated in October 2025 and are owned or controlled by Chen Zhi. Chen is also the majority owner of Hong Kong-based Cloud Nine No. 4 Leasing Company Limited and Cambodia-based CCU Commercial Bank Plc . OFAC is designating Luo, Qiu, Dai, Fang, and Chen pursuant to E.O. 13581, as amended, for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Prince Group TCO. Cloud Nine No. 4 Leasing Company Limited and CCU Commercial Bank PLC are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13581, as amended, for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Chen. Thailand-based White Horse Hotel Management Group Co., Ltd. is a hotel company controlled by Yang Yanming, an individual designated in October 2025 alongside Hu pursuant to E.O. 13581, as amended, for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Palau-based Grand Legend International Asset Management Co., Ltd, which was concurrently designated for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Chen Zhi. OFAC is designating White Horse Hotel Management Group Co., Ltd. pursuant to E.O. 13581, as amended, for being owned or controlled by, or having acted or purported to act for or on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Yang Yanming. SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by a general or specific license issued by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of designated or otherwise blocked persons. Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities involving designated or otherwise blocked persons. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated or blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person. Non-U.S. persons are also prohibited from causing or conspiring to cause U.S. persons to wittingly or unwittingly violate U.S. sanctions, as well as engaging in conduct that evades U.S. sanctions. Individuals located in the U.S. or abroad who provide information about sanctions violations to FinCEN’s whistleblower incentive program may be eligible for awards if the information they provide leads to a successful enforcement action that results in monetary penalties exceeding $1,000,000. The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC’s guidance on Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List . Click here for more information on the individuals and entities designated today . To report internet crime to the FBI, click here. FinCEN’s Notice of Proposed Rulemaking is available here . Written comments on the NPRM may be submitted within 30 days of publication of the NPRM in the Federal Register . ###

Treasury Targets ISIS Facilitators and Disrupts Terrorist Financial Networks

U.S. Department of th e Treasury Office of Public Affairs Press Release: June 22 , 2026 Contact: Treasury Public Affairs, Press@Treasury.gov Treasury Targets ISIS Facilitators and Disrupts Terrorist Financial Networks WASHINGTON — Today, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) designated three individuals and six entities across Europe, the Middle East, and West Africa for facilitating financial transactions on behalf of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). This action targets key facilitators who enable ISIS to move funds among its regional affiliates and in so doing helps protect the rights of religious minorities who have been targeted by ISIS and ISIS-inspired violence. Regardless of the financial instrument, method of transmission, or location of the funds, the Treasury Department will relentlessly pursue ISIS’s finances and disrupt their ability to harm Americans. “ISIS continues to seek new methods and tools to finance terrorist attacks,” said Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent . “The United States will leverage every tool at its disposal to crush ISIS’s remaining capabilities and protect American lives.” Today’s action is being taken pursuant to the counterterrorism authority, Executive Order (E.O.) 13224, as amended. The U.S. Department of State designated ISIS, then known by its former name of Al-Qa’ida in Iraq, as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist pursuant to E.O. 13224 on October 15, 2004, and as a Foreign Terrorist Organization pursuant to section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act on December 17, 2004. ISIS TRANSREGIONAL FACILITATORS ISIS relies on a wide network of financial facilitators that enables the group’s operations. As outlined in Treasury’s 2026 National Terrorist Financing Risk Assessment , as well as the Financial Crimes Enforcement Network’s April 2025 Advisory on the Financing of ISIS and its Global Affiliates , sustained counterterrorism pressure has forced ISIS to become much more decentralized and reliant on more autonomous cells and affiliates throughout the world. Financial facilitators provide critical connectivity between these nodes and ISIS’s General Directorate of Provinces, which provides operational guidance and funding to ISIS regional offices. On May 16, 2026, President Trump announced the killing of Abu-Bilal al-Minuki (al-Minuki) in a coordinated effort involving the United States Department of War and the Government of Nigeria . Al-Minuki, designated by the U.S. Department of State on June 8, 2023 pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, was the number two official in ISIS and led ISIS’s General Directorate of Provinces. ISIS-linked financial facilitators will also be held accountable. Whether individuals are knowingly supporting ISIS, or because of compliance system failures, providing critical financial connectivity to ISIS exposes individuals and firms to the full breadth of Treasury’s authorities. Miloud Abderrahmane (Abderrahmane), based in France, Abdelhakim Boukich (Boukich), based in Syria, and Mohamad Alhmidan (Alhmidan), previously designated by OFAC in March 2016, are three such individuals that have facilitated transactions for ISIS. Abderrahmane, a French-national, has conducted transactions with known ISIS-affiliates, including some who were based in Syria. He has also provided instructional and manufacturing information on explosives to ISIS supporters. Boukich, formerly a Dutch national and an extremist financial facilitator, controls and directs Bitcoin Xchange , a Syria-based money service business (MSB). Bitcoin Xchange was established in late 2020 by Boukich and his Syria-based associates. Boukich and Bitcoin Xchange have transferred money on behalf of ISIS associates originating from multiple countries, including Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, South Africa, and the United States. Alhmidan, an individual sanctioned in 2016 for facilitating logistical and financial support for ISIS, as well as helping support foreign terrorist fighters, also owns and controls Spider Gayrimenkul Ve Genel Ticaret Limited Sirketi (Spider), a Turkiye-based MSB. Alkaram Danismanlik Gayrimenkul Ic Ve Dis Genel Ticaret Limited Sirketi (Alkaram), also a Turkiye-based MSB, further does business as, and operates on behalf of Spider. Originating as a hawala that operated in Syria, Spider was used to transfer money from parts of Syria under ISIS control to other regions not controlled by ISIS. Abderrahmane , Boukich , Bitcoin Xchange , Spider , and Alkaram are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods and services to or in support of, ISIS. ISIS IN WEST AFRICA As demonstrated by the May 16, 2026 killing of al-Minuki, the United States and Nigeria stand together in relentlessly pursuing and eliminating ISIS. This includes cooperation in countering the financing of terrorism and protecting the rights of religious minorities. Nigeria-based Mukhtar Adamu Muhammad (Muhammad) is an ISIS in West Africa (ISIS-WA) financial facilitator that has conducted money transfers on behalf of ISIS-WA. Nine to Nine Exchange Bureau de Change Limited (Nine Exchange), Manhattan Bureau de Change Limited (Manhattan Bureau), and Generation Currency Bureau de Change Limited (Generation Currency) are Nigeria-based MSBs that are owned, controlled, or directed by Muhammad. Muhammad is being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for having materially assisted, sponsored, or provided financial, material, or technological support for, or goods and services to or in support of, ISIS-WA. Nine Exchange , Manhattan Bureau , and Generation Currency are being designated pursuant to E.O. 13224, as amended, for being owned, controlled, or directed by, or having acted or purported to act on behalf of, directly or indirectly, Mukhtar Adamu Muhammad. SANCTIONS IMPLICATIONS As a result of today’s action, all property and interests in property of the designated or blocked persons described above that are in the United States or in the possession or control of U.S. persons are blocked and must be reported to OFAC. In addition, any entities that are owned, directly or indirectly, individually or in the aggregate, 50 percent or more by one or more blocked persons are also blocked. Unless authorized by OFAC, or exempt, OFAC’s regulations generally prohibit all transactions by U.S. persons or within (or transiting) the United States that involve any property or interests in property of blocked persons. Violations of U.S. sanctions may result in the imposition of civil or criminal penalties on U.S. and foreign persons. OFAC may impose civil penalties for sanctions violations on a strict liability basis. OFAC’s Economic Sanctions Enforcement Guidelines provide more information regarding OFAC’s enforcement of U.S. economic sanctions. In addition, financial institutions and other persons may risk exposure to sanctions for engaging in certain transactions or activities involving designated or otherwise blocked persons. The prohibitions include the making of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services by, to, or for the benefit of any designated or blocked person, or the receipt of any contribution or provision of funds, goods, or services from any such person. Non-U.S. persons are also prohibited from causing or conspiring to cause U.S. persons to wittingly or unwittingly violate U.S. sanctions, as well as engaging in conduct that evades U.S. sanctions. Individuals located in the U.S. or abroad who provide information about sanctions violations to FinCEN’s whistleblower incentive program may be eligible for awards if the information they provide leads to a successful enforcement action that results in monetary penalties exceeding $1,000,000. Furthermore, engaging in certain transactions involving the persons designated today may risk the imposition of secondary sanctions on participating foreign financial institutions. OFAC can prohibit or impose strict conditions on opening or maintaining, in the United States, a correspondent account or a payable-through account of a foreign financial institution that knowingly conducts or facilitates any significant transaction on behalf of a person who is designated pursuant to the relevant authority . The power and integrity of OFAC sanctions derive not only from OFAC’s ability to designate and add persons to the SDN List, but also from its willingness to remove persons from the SDN List consistent with the law. The ultimate goal of sanctions is not to punish, but to bring about a positive change in behavior. For information concerning the process for seeking removal from an OFAC list, including the SDN List, or to submit a request, please refer to OFAC’s guidance on Filing a Petition for Removal from an OFAC List . Click here for more information on the persons designated today . ###

Treasury International Capital Data for April

U.S. Department of th e Treasury Office of Public Affairs Press Release: June 18 , 2026 Contact: Treasury Public Affairs, Press@Treasury.gov Treasury International Capital Data for April WASHINGTON – The U.S. Department of the Treasury today released Treasury International Capital (TIC) data for April 2026. The next release, which will report on data for May 2026, is scheduled for July 14, 2026. The sum total in April of all net foreign acquisitions of long-term securities, short-term U.S. securities, and banking flows was a net TIC inflow of $26.1 billion. Of this, net foreign private outflows were $23.1 billion, and net foreign official inflows were $49.2 billion. Foreign residents increased their holdings of long-term U.S. securities in April; their net purchases were $206.0 billion. Net purchases by private foreign investors were $164.4 billion, and net purchases by foreign official institutions were $41.6 billion. U.S. residents increased their holdings of long-term foreign securities, with net purchases of $102.8 billion. After including adjustments, such as estimated foreign portfolio acquisitions of U.S. stocks through stock swaps, overall net foreign purchases of long-term securities are estimated to have been $103.1 billion in April. Foreign residents decreased their holdings of U.S. Treasury bills by $13.6 billion. Foreign resident holdings of all dollar-denominated short-term U.S. securities and other custody liabilities increased by $2.6 billion. Banks’ own net dollar-denominated liabilities to foreign residents de creased by $79.6 billion. Complete data are available on the Treasury website here . ### About TIC Data The monthly data on holdings of long-term securities, as well as the monthly table on Major Foreign Holders of Treasury Securities, reflect foreign holdings of U.S. securities collected primarily on the basis of custodial data. These data help provide a window into foreign ownership of U.S. securities, but they cannot attribute holdings of U.S. securities with complete accuracy. For example, if a U.S. Treasury security purchased by a foreign resident is held in a custodial account in a third country, the true ownership of the security will not be reflected in the data. The custodial data will also not properly attribute U.S. Treasury securities managed by foreign private portfolio managers who invest on behalf of residents of other countries. In addition, foreign countries may hold dollars and other U.S. assets that are not captured in the TIC data. For these reasons, it is difficult to draw precise conclusions from TIC data about changes in the foreign holdings of U.S. financial assets by individual countries. ### slt_table5 2026 Apr.csv PR table for press 2026 Apr.csv npr_history 2026 Apr.csv slt_table1 2026 Apr.csv slt_table4 2026 Apr.csv