Comment from Persistence Analytics Group LLC

To the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration: Persistence Analytics Group LLC appreciates the opportunity to comment on Docket No. NHTSA-2026-0728, concerning modernization of FMVSS No. 135 for Automated Driving Systems-equipped vehicles. I support the objective of updating legacy safety standards so that federal regulation does not unnecessarily require human-driver controls in vehicles designed to operate exclusively through automated driving systems. However, modernization should not replace physical-control assumptions with software-control assumptions unless the operational evidence is strong, transparent, and verifiable. The key issue is not whether a brake pedal exists. The key issue is whether the braking function remains reliable, testable, fail-safe, observable, and accountable across real-world operating conditions. For ADS-equipped vehicles without manual brake controls, NHTSA should ensure that compliance is not limited to nominal stopping-distance performance. The rule should also require clear evidence around: 1. how the ADS commands braking under normal, degraded, emergency, and edge-case conditions; 2. how braking performance is verified when perception, mapping, localization, connectivity, sensor fusion, or onboard compute systems degrade; 3. how the vehicle transitions into a minimum-risk condition if automated braking capability is impaired; 4. how failure modes are detected, logged, reported, and remediated; 5. how over-the-air software updates affecting braking behavior are validated before deployment; 6. how cybersecurity compromise of braking commands or sensor inputs is prevented, detected, and mitigated; 7. how fleet operators, first responders, investigators, insurers, and regulators can access decision-grade evidence after safety events; 8. how NHTSA will distinguish between certified braking performance in controlled tests and reliable braking performance across real operating domains. For driverless vehicles, the absence of a brake pedal shifts responsibility away from a human fallback and onto the automated system, the manufacturer, the software stack, the fleet operator, and the regulatory evidence standard. That shift should be explicit. A vehicle without manual controls may be appropriate if the automated braking system can be proven reliable. But the absence of human controls increases the importance of traceable evidence, failure-mode documentation, event-data capture, and post-deployment monitoring. NHTSA should consider requiring an ADS braking verification file for vehicles certified without manual brake controls. That file should include: • operating design domain assumptions; • braking-system architecture; • sensor and compute dependencies; • degraded-mode behavior; • minimum-risk-condition logic; • validation and simulation results; • closed-course and real-world testing evidence; • cybersecurity controls; • software-update validation procedures; • incident reporting and corrective-action protocols. Modernization is necessary. But public confidence in automated vehicles will depend on whether the safety case is understandable, inspectable, and durable after deployment. The standard should not simply ask whether an ADS-equipped vehicle can stop. It should ask whether the vehicle can reliably determine when to stop, command the braking system, verify that the command executed, respond safely when system components degrade, and produce evidence after the fact. Trust the innovation objective. Verify the braking system. Respectfully, Neil P. Osnato Founder Persistence Analytics Group LLC National Security & Infrastructure Risk Analytics Demand Durability | Grid Stress | Load Integrity neil@persistenceanalyticsgroup.com 609-464-9055 https://persistenceanalyticsgroup.com/