Comment from Anonymous Anonymous

This comment addresses the proposed modernization of FMVSS No. 135 for ADS‑equipped vehicles in docket NHTSA‑2026‑0728. The proposal would remove requirements for hand‑ and foot‑operated service and parking brake controls in ADS‑dedicated vehicles that lack manually operated driving controls, while retaining stopping‑distance performance requirements. Removing those manual controls is understandable for vehicles not intended to be driven by a human occupant, but it exposes a closely related safety question the NPRM does not resolve: what minimum passenger‑accessible means must exist to request a controlled stop in an emergency? NHTSA states that if manual controls are removed it expects passengers will still be provided with a means to direct an ADS‑operated vehicle to stop, and that how passengers indicate that desire would vary by manufacturer. That expectation is not the same as a requirement and risks ADS‑dedicated vehicles in which occupants have no reliable, immediately accessible way to interrupt a trip when urgent circumstances arise. This is a foreseeable safety gap, not merely a hypothetical inconvenience. In a vehicle with no steering wheel, no brake pedal, and no occupant‑accessible emergency intervention control, a passenger facing a medical emergency, a fire or smoke event, a threatening passenger, a perceived malfunction, or another urgent need to stop may have no direct physical means to request a controlled stop. Eliminating manual driving controls does not eliminate the need for an occupant fallback pathway; it increases the importance of one. The NPRM emphasizes that FMVSS No. 135 is a brake‑performance standard and that this proposal would ensure ADS‑equipped vehicles without manual controls can meet stopping‑distance requirements once brake controls are actuated. It separately notes that whether brakes are actuated appropriately in a given scenario is an ADS‑performance question to be addressed in another standard. That distinction is correct, but it underscores the problem: a stopping‑distance requirement governs how the vehicle must stop once commanded; it does not ensure that an occupant has any dependable way to issue or trigger that command under urgent real‑world conditions. The discussion of brake warning telltales also supports the need for a passenger emergency stop function. NHTSA tentatively concludes that brake warnings remain safety‑critical for occupants in vehicles without manually operated driving controls because passengers may use this information to decline a trip, stop an ongoing trip, or report a malfunction. If occupants must receive safety‑critical brake information to make safety‑related decisions, they should also have a clearly defined means to act on that information by requesting a controlled minimal‑risk stop or pull‑over. NHTSA should therefore require ADS‑equipped vehicles without manually operated driving controls to include at least one clearly labeled, passenger‑accessible physical emergency trip‑interruption control. That control should initiate a controlled minimal‑risk stop or pull‑over and remain operable regardless of ADS state, including degraded operation short of total power loss. At minimum, the agency should specify baseline attributes: conspicuous labeling; physical accessibility from the occupant compartment; operability without needing to unlock a phone or navigate a menu; and predictable, auditable behavior in emergency use. A direct physical control is preferable to relying only on an app or in‑vehicle screen. App availability, connectivity, battery condition, software state, screen failure, and interface complexity can all degrade usability at exactly the moment when immediate access matters most. Supplementary digital interfaces can be helpful, but they are not adequate substitutes for a primary physical emergency intervention control. This recommendation does not require NHTSA to preserve a conventional brake pedal or steering wheel in ADS‑dedicated vehicles. It instead reflects a narrower principle: if the agency removes human fallback driving controls as unnecessary for ADS‑dedicated operation, it should also require the occupant fallback control that replaces them for emergency trip interruption. NHTSA has specifically requested comment on consequences of removing hand‑ and foot‑operated brake controls and on other considerations related to ADS vehicle operation; the absence of a required passenger emergency stop mechanism is one such consequence and should be addressed in this rulemaking or expressly reserved for prompt action in the related ADS safety‑performance framework the agency is developing.