Comment from Anonymous

I understand and share the concern that some employers and workers may abuse employment-based immigration programs through fake credentials, misrepresented job duties, proxy interviews, sham consulting arrangements, subcontracting abuse, or failure to perform the work described in the petition. These practices, when they occur, harm U.S. workers, legitimate foreign workers, and compliant employers. They should be investigated and punished. But the proposed rule addresses that problem with the wrong tool. Raising prevailing wage levels across H-1B, H-1B1, E-3, and PERM does not directly detect fake resumes, proxy interviews, fraudulent consulting arrangements, offshore outsourcing of assigned work, or misrepresented job duties. A wage increase is a proxy penalty imposed on everyone, including employers and workers who followed the rules. DOL states that the proposed rule would use OEWS wage data and statistically derived percentile thresholds to align foreign-worker wages with wages paid to similarly employed U.S. workers. DOL proposes to raise the four wage levels from roughly the 17th, 34th, 50th, and 67th percentiles to the 34th, 52nd, 70th, and 88th percentiles. But this methodology does not measure whether an individual worker has a fake resume, whether an interview was completed by a proxy, whether the worker is performing the assigned job, or whether a staffing company is misusing the program. It simply raises wage floors. That mismatch matters. If the problem is fraud, the remedy should be fraud enforcement. If the problem is misclassification, the remedy should be classification review. If the problem is proxy interviewing, the remedy should be identity verification and employer accountability. A broad wage increase does not reliably solve any of those problems. DOL may argue that higher wage floors reduce the incentive to hire lower-quality or underqualified foreign workers. But this assumes that salary is a reliable proxy for skill, honesty, and job performance. It is not. A fraudulent applicant can still misrepresent qualifications at a higher salary level, while a legitimate early-career engineer, researcher, teacher, analyst, or healthcare worker may be priced out despite being fully qualified and lawfully employed. The rule would therefore miss some bad actors while harming lawful participants. DOL may further argue that broad wage rules are easier to administer than case-by-case fraud enforcement. Administrative simplicity is not enough. The INA requires wages tied to similarly employed workers and wage levels commensurate with experience, education, and supervision. A rule that does not measure fraud, performance, education, experience, supervision, or actual job duties cannot be justified merely because it is easier to administer. Simplicity is not statutory fit. A better approach would target the specific abuses directly. DOL and USCIS should increase audits and site visits for employers with high rates of third-party placement, repeated Level I filings inconsistent with job duties, unusually high amendment rates, or prior violations. Agencies should require stronger documentation of the actual worksite, end-client assignment, job duties, supervision, and employer-employee relationship for staffing and consulting arrangements. They should impose meaningful penalties, debarment, petition revocation, and referral for criminal investigation where employers or applicants use fake resumes, proxy interviews, sham placements, or fraudulent experience claims. DOL should also strengthen worker-protective enforcement. Legitimate H-1B workers are often harmed by the same abusive employers that harm U.S. workers. Workers should have safe reporting channels, anti-retaliation protections, and clear transfer options when they report fraud or exploitation. Punishing all H-1B workers through inflated wage floors makes legitimate workers more dependent on employers and may make them less willing to report abuse. This rule should distinguish between fraud and lawful employment. Fraud should be punished. Underpayment should be punished. Misclassification should be punished. But compliant employers and legitimate foreign workers should not be burdened by a broad wage increase that does not directly identify or correct the alleged misconduct. For these reasons, DOL should not use prevailing-wage inflation as a substitute for fraud enforcement. DOL should withdraw or narrow the proposed wage increase and instead adopt targeted anti-fraud measures, including enhanced audits, identity-verification safeguards for interviews where appropriate, stricter review of third-party placement, stronger end-client documentation, employer debarment for repeat violators, and safe reporting protections for workers. This approach would protect U.S. workers without unfairly harming legitimate H-1B workers and employers who comply with the law.