Comment on FR Doc # 2026-09159
Laurie FettigOpposeOther
Summary: The commenter opposes the proposed definition of "willfully" for firearms violations, arguing that it expands the statutory standard beyond what Congress intended and risks punishing licensees for inadvertent mistakes or negligence. They argue that the proposal introduces subjective standards and could lead to inconsistent enforcement, advocating instead for a definition based on longstanding judicial precedent.
The proposed definition of “willfully” expands the statutory standard established by Congress and risks lowering the burden required for revoking a Federal Firearms License. The Gun Control Act authorizes revocation only for willful violations, reflecting Congress’s intent that licensees not lose their livelihood because of inadvertent mistakes or ordinary negligence. ATF should not redefine this statutory term in a manner that broadens its application beyond its well-established legal meaning.
Federal courts have consistently held that willfulness requires evidence that a licensee knew of a legal obligation and intentionally disregarded it or acted with plain indifference toward that obligation. While repeated violations may be relevant, they are only one factor in determining intent. The proposed rule gives undue weight to repeated violations by suggesting they may be sufficient to establish willfulness. This risks creating a presumption that recurring errors equate to intentional misconduct, even when they result from clerical mistakes, employee turnover, changing guidance, or other unintentional causes.
Although the proposal states that inadvertent errors should not form the basis for revocation, the practical effect is to blur the distinction between negligence and willfulness. The totality of the circumstances should remain the controlling standard without implying that repeated paperwork violations alone are evidence of intentional disregard for the law.
The proposal also introduces subjective concepts such as “appropriate remedial action,” “reasonable steps,” and “failing to prevent recurrence.” These terms lack clear, objective standards and could lead to inconsistent enforcement depending on the judgment of individual inspectors. When the consequence is the loss of a federal license, regulated businesses deserve clear and predictable standards rather than discretionary interpretations.
The provisions addressing employee misconduct are equally concerning. While licensees should be responsible for maintaining effective compliance programs, they should not face revocation based on ATF’s after-the-fact assessment of whether disciplinary measures were “appropriate.” Employment decisions involve numerous legal and practical considerations beyond ATF’s expertise. A licensee that promptly investigates a violation, retrains employees, updates procedures, and strengthens internal controls should not risk license revocation because ATF believes stronger disciplinary action should have been taken.
The proposal states that it rejects strict vicarious liability, yet it effectively moves in that direction by allowing management’s response to employee mistakes to become evidence of willfulness. Congress chose the term “willfully” to distinguish intentional misconduct from ordinary human error. Expanding that definition through regulation risks replacing a statutory standard with a negligence-based compliance standard.
Finally, ATF’s reliance on Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo does not support expanding the meaning of “willfully.” That decision reaffirmed that courts—not agencies—have the ultimate responsibility to determine the meaning of statutes. Because “willfully” has long been interpreted by the federal courts, ATF should not adopt a regulatory definition that effectively broadens the statutory requirement.
ATF should instead adopt language consistent with longstanding judicial precedent: a violation is willful only when a licensee knew of a legal requirement and intentionally disregarded or was plainly indifferent to that known obligation. Repeated violations may be considered as part of the totality of the circumstances but should never, standing alone, establish willfulness. Such an approach preserves Congress’s intent, provides clearer guidance to licensees, and ensures that revocation remains reserved for truly intentional violations rather than inadvertent compliance errors.