Comment on FR Doc # 2026-08929

I oppose the proposed rule and respectfully urge the Bureau to withdraw it and issue in its place a rule that adheres to the plain text of the Gun Control Act, respects the boundary Congress drew between commercial dealers and private citizens, and abandons the interpretive theories that federal courts have rejected. The proposal rescinds the form of the prior rule while preserving its substance. Removing the codified presumptions accomplishes little if the Bureau continues to read the definition of “engaged in the business” to reach the same conduct by the same reasoning. A partial retreat that leaves the underlying theory intact does not restore the limits Congress enacted. The Bureau should abandon the prior interpretation in full rather than restate it in a narrower form. Congress, not the Bureau, defines the scope of federal licensing authority. In Garland v. Cargill, 602 U.S. 406 (2024), the Court held that the Bureau exceeded its statutory authority when it construed the definition of “machinegun” to reach conduct the statute did not cover, reading the text as Congress wrote it rather than as the agency preferred to enforce it. In Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369 (2024), the Court overruled Chevron and held that courts must exercise independent judgment in deciding whether an agency has acted within its statutory authority, and may not defer to an agency’s reading merely because a statute is called ambiguous. These decisions foreclose any expansive construction of “engaged in the business” that rests on agency preference rather than statutory command. The line between commercial dealers and private collectors is statutory. The Gun Control Act requires a license only of a person engaged in the business as a dealer, and it excludes a person who makes occasional sales, exchanges, or purchases of firearms for the enhancement of a personal collection or for a hobby, or who sells all or part of a personal collection. See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(21)(C). That exclusion is a limitation Congress placed in the statute itself, not a matter of administrative grace. A rule that treats ordinary private transfers as presumptive commercial dealing erodes a distinction Congress chose to preserve and exposes law-abiding owners to obligations and criminal jeopardy the statute does not impose. Lawful conduct and intent alone cannot supply proof of unlicensed dealing. Maintaining a record of one’s own firearms, parting with a recently acquired firearm, or offering a firearm for sale are lawful acts undertaken for many reasons unrelated to commerce. A rule that infers criminal dealing from such conduct, or that rests on asserted intent divorced from the statutory requirement of repetitive purchase and resale to predominantly earn a profit, cannot be reconciled with the text Congress enacted. The final rule should state that the statutory elements govern and that lawful conduct and intent alone are insufficient. Finally, drawing substantial numbers of private, occasional transfers into the federal licensing and background-check regime raises a question of vast economic and political significance. When an agency claims authority over such a matter, it must point to clear congressional authorization for the power it asserts. West Virginia v. EPA, 597 U.S. 697 (2022). Congress has repeatedly considered and declined to mandate universal background checks. The Bureau may not achieve through the definition of “engaged in the business” what Congress has withheld. For these reasons, I respectfully request that the Bureau withdraw the proposed rule and issue a new rule that follows the plain language of the Gun Control Act, preserves the statutory exclusion for private collectors and hobbyists, rejects the theory that lawful conduct or intent alone establishes unlicensed dealing, and confirms that only Congress may extend the licensing and background-check regime to private, occasional transfers. Thank you for your consideration.